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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to decide this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h)(1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding Ms. 
Black alimony that was nonterminable, even upon her remarriage? 
The standard of appellate review is an abuse of discretion. See 
Johnson v. Johnson, 855 P.2d 250, 251-252 (Utah Ct. App 1993). Mr. 
Barney preserved this issue in the trial court. R. 566. 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding 
child support to Ms. Black in the amount of $2,220.00 by 
extrapolation of the statutory child support table? The standard 
of appellate review is an abuse of discretion. See Ball v. 
Peterson, 912 P.2d 1006, 1009 (Utah Ct. App 1996). Mr. Barney 
preserved this issue in the trial court. R. 996, pp. 40-42. 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding 
judgment in favor of Ms. Black in the amount of: (i) $8,000.00 
representing one-half of the value of the duplex real property 
awarded to Mr. Barney; and (ii) $2 0,000.00 representing one half of 
the value of the dental practice awarded to Mr. Barney. The 
standard of appellate review is an abuse of discretion. See Hall 
v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Utah Ct. App 1993). Mr. Barney 
preserved this issue in the trial court. R. 995, pp. 56-8 and R. 
996, pp. 55-60. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
1. Relative to the nonterminable alimony issue, Utah Code 
Ann. § 30-3-5(8) (1999) is determinative, which provides, in 
relevant part: 
(8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically 
provides otherwise, any order of the court 
that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
automatically terminates upon the remarriage 
or death of that former spouse. . . . 
2. Relative to the child support issue, Utah Code Ann. § 78-
45-7.12 (1999) is determinative, which provides: 
If the combined adjusted gross income exceeds 
the highest level specified in the table, an 
appropriate and just child support amount 
shall be ordered on a case-by-case basis, but 
the amount ordered may not be less than the 
highest level specified in the table for the 
number of children due support. 
3. Relative to the judgment issue, Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-
5(1) (1999) is determinative, which provides, in relevant part: 
When a decree of divorce is rendered, the 
court may include in it equitable orders 
relating to the children, property, debts or 
obligations, and parties. . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Course of Proceedings. 
This is a divorce action. On March 26, 1997, Ms. Black filed 
her Complaint for divorce. R. 1-12. 
On August 8, 1997, the trial court entered an Order on Order 
to Show Cause setting temporary terms during the pendency of the 
action relative to a hearing before Commissioner David S. Dillon 
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held on June 5, 1997. R. 148-53. Each party filed objections to 
the recommendations of the Commissioner. R. 114-22. On November 
3, 1997, the trial court conducted a hearing on the objections and 
overruled the objections. R. 268-71. 
On November 25, 1997, the trial court entered a Judgment and 
Decree of Divorce, whereby the parties were divorced and all other 
issues were reserved. R. 214-7. 
On April 14, 1998, the trial court entered an Order on Order 
to Show Cause relative to a hearing before Commissioner Scott M. 
Hadley held on December 10, 1997. R. 284-91. In the Order on 
Order to Show Cause, among other items, (i) judgment was entered 
against Mr. Barney in the amount of $11,882.26 in favor of Ms. 
Black for alimony arrearages less certain offsets, (ii) Mr. Barney 
was found not to be in contempt for his failure to pay the 
temporary alimony amounts for the reasons that he did not have the 
ability to pay the amounts he was ordered to pay and that Mr. 
Barney had not been financially irresponsible since the time of the 
hearing setting temporary alimony; (iii) the trial court reserved 
the issue of whether Ms. Black had interfered with Mr. Barney's 
physical and telephone visitation until an evidentiary hearing 
could be held; and (iv) Ms. Black was found in contempt for her 
failure to seek or secure employment as ordered at the time of the 
hearing setting temporary alimony on June 5, 1997. 
On October 22, 1998, the trial court entered its Findings, 
Recommendation and Order relative to Mr. Barney's Motion for 
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Citation of Contempt and Other Relief which was heard by 
Commissioner Scott M. Hadley on May 18, 1998. R. 50 3-14. In the 
Findings, Recommendation and Order, the trial court, among other 
things, (i) found Ms. Black in contempt for her failure to seek 
employment or to keep and provide a log of her attempts to secure 
employment; (ii) found Ms. Black to not be in contempt as to 
visitation interference but did find that she had violated the 
order of the trial court relative to the visitation that had been 
ordered; (iii) found Ms. Black in contempt for involving the 
children in the financial issues between the parties, and (iv) 
awarded Mr. Barney his attorney fees as a sanction against Ms. 
Black. 
On October 23, 1998, Mr. Barney filed a Motion in Limine to 
Exclude Certain Testimony. R. 517-25. The Motion was filed to 
exclude any testimony which Ms. Black might attempt to illicit from 
any expert or other witness at trial on the value of Mr. Barney's 
dental practice which included goodwill as an element. Over 
objection, the trial court received evidence regarding the alleged 
goodwill present in Mr. Barney's dental practice. R. 994, pp. 234-
97. 
Trial was conducted on October 27 and 29, 1998. R. 526-27. 
After considering the closing arguments of counsel, the trial court 
ruled on the issues before it. R. 526-7 and R. 995, pp. 1-67. As 
a part of that ruling, the trial court held that alimony would 
terminate on the statutory events. R. 527 and R. 995, p. 54. At 
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the conclusion of the ruling, Ms. Black requested the trial court 
to consider the potential of awarding nonterminable alimony. R. 
995, p. 61. The trial court reversed its prior ruling, reserved 
the issue of nonterminable alimony and requested the parties to 
file post-trial briefs on the issue. R. 995, pp. 61-3. On 
February 1, 1999, the trial court issued its Memorandum Decision on 
the issue of nonterminable alimony and granted the same to Ms. 
Black. R. 704-7. 
Mr. Barney filed objections to the form of the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared by counsel for Ms. Black. R. 
760-803. On March 15, 1999, the trial court heard argument on the 
objections. R. 810 and R. 996, pp. 1-76. On June 8, 1999, the 
trial court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 
832-66) and its Divorce Decree (R. 813a-831). The Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce are included as 
Exhibits A and B, respectively, of the Addendum. 
On June 15, 1999, Mr. Barney filed his Notice of Appeal. R. 
867-9. 
Ms. Black remarried on May 15, 1999. R. 889. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
Marriage and Children 
Mr. Barney and Ms. Black married on June 6, 1974, and divorced 
on November 16, 1997, a marriage of over 23 years. R. 833. The 
parties have five children born as issue of the marriage, three of 
whom were minors at the time of the divorce. R. 2. 
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Education and Employment of the Parties 
Mr. Barney completed three years of his bachelor's degree and 
Ms. Black attended some college prior to their marriage. After 
their marriage in June 1974, Mr. Barney was accepted to dental 
school beginning with the 1974-1975 school year. Mr. Barney's 
first year of dental school was accepted as credit for the fourth 
year of his bachelor's degree and he was awarded his bachelor of 
science degree in 1975. Mr. Barney's dental schooling was paid for 
by the United States Air Force through a health professional 
scholarship, which included the payment of books, tuition, fees and 
a $400.00 per month stipend. Both parties worked part-time jobs 
during the dental schooling to supplement their income. Mr. Barney 
was awarded his dental degree in 1978. Mr. Barney pursued advanced 
training and was awarded a certificate in periodontics in 1984. R. 
841-2. 
At the time the parties began having children, the parties 
agreed that Ms. Black would stay at home to care for the children 
and the household. Ms. Black did not pursue additional education 
or seek employment during the marriage although she worked 
sporadically in Mr. Barney's dental practice substituting for 
regular office employees and as a dental assistance as occasion 
required. Ms. Black also assisted Mr. Barney in setting up and 
decorating his office. R. 842-3. 
Mr. Barney continues to practice as a periodontist in Bozeman, 
Montana, earning an average of $13,500.00 per month after business 
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expenses but before the payment of personal income and other 
employment taxes. R. 850. 
At the time of trial, Ms. Black was living in Ogden, Utah, and 
was enrolled in college. R. 850. Ms. Black moved to St. George, 
Utah, in July 1999, and is apparently neither enrolled in school 
nor employed. R. 934. Ms. Black suffers from no disability 
preventing her from working. R. 993, pp. 66-70. During the 
pendency of the action before the trial court, Ms. Black was twice 
held in contempt for not securing employment. R. 284-91 and R. 
503-14. 
Inheritance 
During the course of the marriage, Ms. Black received an 
inheritance in the amount of $125,000.00 paid in several 
installments from 1988 to 1996. All of the money was commingled 
with the parties1 marital assets and/or used to pay marital 
expenses. R. 839-40. 
Lifestyle and Financial Irresponsibility of the Parties During the 
Marriage 
During the first years of the marriage, while Mr. Barney was 
attending dental school, the parties enjoyed, as he describes it, 
a "macaroni and cheese and hot dog lifestyle." After dental 
school, Mr. Barney served in the United States Air Force for 13 
years and enjoyed a "middle or upper middle class lifestyle" 
earning a maximum of $50,000.00 per year. After leaving the 
military and entering into private practice and while living in 
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Bozeman, Montana, and Ogden, Utah, the parties lived "high off the 
hog" and a "more lavish lifestyle than what was affordable." Both 
parties testified that they had been fiscally irresponsible during 
the last four or five years of the marriage. R. 132-9. Both the 
domestic relations commissioner and the trial court judge found the 
same. R. 149 and R. 995, pp. 41-42. The trial court found that 
the parties lived an "extravagant and expensive lifestyle" and that 
the lifestyle could not be maintained after divorce. R. 850-2. 
Divorce Decree 
In the Divorce Decree, the trial court, among other things, 
ordered the following: 
The parties were awarded joint legal custody of the three 
minor children with Ms. Black being awarded primary physical 
custody and Mr. Barney being awarded reasonable rights of 
visitation. R. 813-7. 
Ms. Black was awarded child support in the amount of $2,220.00 
per month based on an extrapolation of the statutory child support 
table. R. 821-2. The parties were ordered to equally pay the out-
of-pocket medical and dental costs incurred for the benefit of the 
minor children. R. 817. 
Ms. Black was awarded alimony in the amount of $2,000.00 per 
month for five years from the date of trial and $3,000.00 per month 
thereafter. R. 822-3. The trial court did not make a specific 
finding on Ms. Black's reasonable financial needs other than to 
state that her need, based on the extravagant lifestyle the parties 
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attempted to live during the last few years of the marriage, was 
greater than Mr. Barney's ability to pay. R. 850. 
In the event Ms. Black remarried or cohabited at any time 
within five years from the date of trial, alimony would be reduced 
to $1,500.00 per month and increased to $2,000.00 per month 
thereafter. This alimony would not terminate on remarriage. R. 
823. The trial court held all alimony would terminate on the death 
of either party or after 23 % years from the time of divorce. R. 
824. 
The parties equitably divided their personal property 
including furniture, furnishings and vehicles. R. 817. Mr. Barney 
was awarded his dental practice at a total value of $4 0,000.00. R. 
818. Ms. Black was awarded the marital residence at a value of 
$24,455.00 and Mr. Barney was awarded a duplex at a value of 
$16,000.00. R. 818-9 and 837-8. Both real properties have been 
lost by the parties to foreclosure. Each party was awarded one 
half of an IRA with a total value of approximately $3,600.00. R. 
819. 
Mr. Barney was ordered to pay the federal and state income 
taxes, penalties and interest owing to the Internal Revenue Service 
and the State of Wyoming in the amount of $75,483.00. R. 819-20. 
Ms. Black was awarded attorney fees and costs through the time 
of trial in the amount of $15,655.62. R. 824-5. The trial court 
denied Ms. Black's motion to be awarded additional post-trial 
attorney fees and costs in the amount of $15,892.00. R. 825. 
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The Court awarded Ms. Black a judgment against Mr. Barney for 
the following amounts: 
$11,882.26 Judgment for temporary alimony 
-4,759.05 Offsets awarded Mr. Barney 
5,562.44 Contingent amounts awarded to Ms. Black 
in the event the marital residence was 
not lost to foreclosure 
8,000.00 One-half of the value of the duplex 
property awarded to Mr. Barney 
20,000.00 One half of the value of the dental 
practice awarded to Mr. Barney 
15.655.62 Attorney fees and costs awarded to Ms. 
Black 
$56,341.27 Total judgment amount 
R. 825-30. In that the marital residence was lost to foreclosure, 
the $5,562.44 amount is no longer a part of the judgment. 
Bankruptcy 
Mr. Barney continues to attempt to work through his financial 
difficulties in an effort to avoid having to file for bankruptcy. 
Ms. Black filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy at approximately the time 
the divorce action was initially commenced. R. 821. On July 1, 
1999, Ms. Black filed a second bankruptcy under chapter 13 
primarily in order to eliminate the attorney fees owed to her trial 
counsel, Steve S. Christensen. R. 93 3. Mr. Christensen filed a 
claim in the bankruptcy and Ms. Black objected to the claim. The 
judge in the bankruptcy case reduced Mr. Christensen's claim to 
$5,000.00. That order has not yet been entered by the bankruptcy 
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court and will undoubtedly be appealed by Mr. Christensen. The 
trial court in this divorce action may have to re-visit the issue 
of the award of attorney fees once an order is entered by the 
bankruptcy court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court abused its discretion by awarding Ms. Black 
nonterminable alimony. Mr. Barney does not appeal the award of 
alimony or the amount of the alimony awarded. None of the trial 
court's findings regarding nonterminable alimony provide a factual 
or legal basis for the award. Accordingly, alimony should have 
terminated on the remarriage of Ms. Black. 
The trial court abused its discretion in the amount of child 
support awarded to Ms. Black. At trial, evidence must be 
introduced to establish the reasonable needs of the children before 
the trial court can award child support greater than the highest 
table amount. The trial court entered only conclusory findings 
regarding the needs of the children. In addition, although 
required under Utah case law, the trial court did not use linear 
extrapolation to calculate the amount of child support awarded. 
Accordingly, child support should be awarded at the highest 
statutory table amount. 
The trial court abused its discretion by awarding Ms. Black 
judgments in favor of Ms. Black in the amounts of: (i) $8,000.00 
representing one-half of the value of the duplex real property 
awarded to Mr. Barney; and (ii) $20,000.00 representing one-half of 
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the value of the dental practice awarded to Mr. Barney. These 
judgments were awarded based on factors which cannot be legally 
supported. Accordingly, the judgment amounts should be vacated. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION BY AWARDING MS. BLACK 
NONTERMINABLE ALIMONY 
The trial court abused its discretion by awarding Ms. Black 
nonterminable alimony, that is alimony that continues despite her 
remarriage. Mr. Barney does not appeal the award of alimony or the 
amount of alimony awarded. Rather, Mr. Barney appeals the trial 
court's order that alimony survives Ms. Black's remarriage, which 
occurred on May 15, 1999. 
The presumption that alimony terminates upon the remarriage of 
the recipient spouse is firmly rooted in Utah law and common sense. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8) provides, in relevant part: 
Unless a decree of divorce specifically 
provides otherwise, any order of the court 
that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
automatically terminates upon the* remarriage 
or death of that former spouse. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (8) (1999) . In fact, the issue of 
nonterminable alimony has been before this Court previously in 
Johnson v. Johnson, 855 P.2d 250 (Utah Ct. App 1993). In Johnson, 
this Court considered the issue of nonterminable alimony under 
facts and circumstances very similar to those present in this case. 
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In Johnson, this Court, in interpreting Section 30-3-5(8), stated 
as follows: 
Alimony is presumed to terminate upon the 
remarriage of the receiving spouse. Utah Code 
Ann. § 30-3-5(5) (1989), states that ,f[u]nless 
a decree of divorce specifically provides 
otherwise, any order of the court that a party 
pay alimony to a former spouse automatically 
terminates upon the remarriage of the former 
spouse." The trial court therefore has the 
discretion to make an award of alimony that 
will survive the marriage of the receiving 
spouse. In exercising this discretion, 
however, the trial court must make adequate 
and specific findings of fact justifying such 
an award. Such an award must also comply with 
the relevant legal principles governing 
alimony awards. 
Id. at 252. 
The Johnson trial court relied on two findings to support its 
award of nonterminable alimony. First, the trial court found that 
nonterminable alimony was awarded to assist in the support of the 
receiving spouse, Ms. Johnson. This Court indicated that 
"[sjtanding alone, however, it is not a sufficient reason to extend 
alimony payments beyond the remarriage of the receiving spouse. To 
allow nonterminable awards to be based on this justification alone 
would violate the statutory presumption against such awards, since 
every alimony award is necessarily based upon this justification." 
Id. Therefore, as an undisputed matter of law, a recipient 
spouse's need for alimony does not support an award of 
nonterminable alimony. 
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The Johnson trial court's other rationale for the award of 
nonterminable alimony was to allow Ms. Johnson to "share in the 
benefits of [Mr. Johnson's] professional status." Id. This Court 
determined that this was just another way of saying that Ms. 
Johnson was to share in Mr. Johnson's professional degree. This 
Court held that "[i]nasmuch as it is legally impermissive to grant 
a share or interest of one spouse's professional degree or license 
to another spouse upon divorce, it is likewise impermissible to 
award nonterminable alimony on a finding that one spouse is 
entitled to share in the benefits of the other spouse's 
professional degree or license." Id. at 253.1 This Court 
concluded therefore, that the trial court's award of nonterminable 
alimony on these facts constituted an abuse of discretion. 
Like the trial court in Johnson. the trial court in this case 
abused its discretion by failing to make findings which legally 
support its award of nonterminable alimony. As will be clearly 
shown below, none of the trial court's findings regarding 
nonterminable alimony provide factual or legal support for the 
award. As such, the award of nonterminable alimony must be vacated 
as a matter of law. 
In Johnson, this Court relied on the well settled law of Utah that a 
professional degree or license is not marital property to be divided at 
divorce. See Peterson v. Peterson, 737 P.2d 237 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) and 
Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538 (Utah 1991). 
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The trial court in this case made fifteen written findings 
which, at least ostensibly, relate to the award of alimony.2 In 
finding no. 43, the trial court found as follows: 
a. Although the Petitioner was pursuing a 
college degree at the time of the 
parties1 marriage, she set aside her 
personal and educational pursuits in 
order to raise five children, to be at 
home with them, to maintain the household 
and to enable and assist Respondent in 
obtaining his professional degree as well 
as develop his professional skills. 
b. The Petitioner devoted all of her 
attention to raising the family and 
supporting the Respondent during her 
twenty three years of marriage to the 
Respondent. 
c. Both parties had approximately equal 
earning capacity, education and 
experience going into the marriage. 
During the marriage, Petitioner was not 
able to advance her earning ability 
because of her support of the family and 
of Respondent's professional education 
and business. 
d. Respondent was able to obtain a dental 
degree, a graduate degree in dentistry, 
acquire seventeen (17) years of dental 
experience and establish his own private 
practice, giving him the earning ability 
of $13,500.00 a month, all with the 
support of the Petitioner. 
e. Both parties were equal contributors in 
advancing Respondent's educational 
training. 
On February 1, 1999, the trial court entered a Memorandum Decision 
awarding the nonterminable alimony. The findings in the Memorandum Decision 
are similar, although not identical, to the specific findings that were 
included in the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law. The Memorandum 
Decision is included as Exhibit C in the Addendum. 
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Petitioner assisted in the dental 
practice when needed. 
Petitioner has minimal earning capacity 
and no marketable skills. It is not 
likely given her age of forty three (43) 
years that Petitioner will ever attain 
the skills or earning capacity to support 
herself at the standard of living she 
enjoyed during the marriage. 
Petitioner contributed $125,000.00 of her 
inheritance into the marriage. 
The parties spent all of the money that 
Respondent earned. The parties are left 
with virtually no assets to be divided 
among them at the end of the marriage. 
The parties have no retirement benefits 
or savings other than an IRA. 
Petitioner is entitled to a non-
terminable award of alimony because of 
her contribution to Respondent's 
increased earning capacity during the 
marriage. 
The only way to provide the Petitioner a 
compensating adjustment for her 
contribution to the greatly enhanced 
earning capacity of the Respondent is to 
award her non-terminable alimony. 
Non-terminable alimony will be necessary 
to maintain Petitioner at a standard of 
living similar to that which existed 
during the marriage. 
This award of alimony is not an award of 
any interest in the professional degree 
of Respondent. Respondent's income from 
his practice may change without affecting 
the amount of alimony he pays to the 
Petitioner. 
Respondent has the ability to pay non-
terminable alimony which is less than the 
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court ordered alimony in paragraphs 3 6 
and 41 above. 
The trial court's findings with respect to nonterminable 
alimony fall into several categories, none of which legally support 
the award. 
Ms. Black's Need for Alimony 
Findings c, g, i, j, and m relate to Ms. Black's need for 
alimony. The trial court noted the financial irresponsibility of 
the parties, the finite earning capacity of Ms. Black, and the 
standard of living of the parties. Each one of these findings go 
to Ms. Black's need for alimony. A recipient spouse's need for 
alimony is relevant with respect to whether alimony is awarded or 
not and, if so, at what amount. As indicated above, Mr. Barney is 
appealing neither the award of alimony nor the amount. Mr. Barney 
only appeals the trial court's determination that alimony would not 
terminate upon Ms. Black's remarriage. 
As this Court made absolutely clear in Johnson, to allow a 
trial court to award nonterminable alimony on the basis of the 
financial need of the recipient spouse alone "would violate the 
statutory presumption against such awards, since every alimony 
award is necessarily based upon this justification." Id. at 252. 
Therefore, the trial court's findings as to Ms. Black's need for 
financial assistance cannot as a matter of law support the 
nonterminable element of the alimony award. 
17 
Mr. Barney's A b i l i t y to Pay Alimony 
In f inding o of paragraph 43, the t r i a l court found that Mr, 
Barney has the a b i l i t y t o pay nonterminable alimony. This f inding 
su f f er s from the same de f i c i ency as the f indings r e l a t i n g to Ms. 
Black's need for alimony. Every alimony award i s n e c e s s a r i l y based 
on the payor spouse's a b i l i t y t o pay alimony3. Accordingly, t h i s 
f a c t does not support an award of nonterminable alimony. See i d . 
Mr. Barney's Dental Degree and Training 
Findings a, c, d, e, k, 1 and n a l l attempt t o j u s t i f y the 
award of nonterminable alimony on the bas i s of Ms. Black's i n t e r e s t 
in Mr. Barney's dental degree and t r a i n i n g . While the t r i a l court 
a r t i c u l a t e s these f indings in terms of Mr. Barney's "earning 
capac i ty ," the t r i a l court was in f a c t making a de f a c t o d i v i s i o n 
of Mr. Barney's pro fe s s iona l degree, which the law f o r b i d s . This 
Court's d e c i s i o n in Johnson l e f t no doubt tha t i t i s " l e g a l l y 
impermissible" t o "award nonterminable alimony on a f inding that 
one spouse i s e n t i t l e d t o share in the b e n e f i t s of the other 
spouse 's profes s iona l degree or l i c e n s e . Such an award i s a de 
The version of U.C.A. § 30-3-5(7) (a) effect ive a t the time of t r i a l 
provided: 
The court shal l consider a t l ea s t the following 
factors in determining alimony: 
(i) the f inancial condition and needs of the 
rec ipient spouse; 
( i i ) the r e c i p i e n t ' s earning capacity or a b i l i t y 
to produce income; 
( i i i ) the a b i l i t y of the payor spouse to provide 
support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage. Id. 
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facto division of the professional degree or license." Xd at 253. 
In the instant case, the trial court found that Ms. Black should 
receive an award of nonterminable alimony because she assisted Mr. 
Barney in obtaining a dental degree and training, and 
correspondingly, an increased earning capacity. In light of this 
Court's holding in Johnson, the trial court's decision constitutes 
a clear abuse of discretion. 
The trial court's findings also fail to address the important 
factual point that Mr. Barney largely supported the family during 
dental school. Mr. Barney's dental schooling was paid for by the 
United States Air Force through health professional scholarships 
including books, tuition, fees and $400.00 per month stipend. R. 
841-2. 
Ms. Black's Educational and Career Development 
In findings a, b, c, and g of paragraph 43, the trial court 
found that Mr. Barney and Ms. Black started out on even footing as 
to education and earning capacity at the time of the marriage. 
However, Ms. Black decided to not further pursue her education or 
career but rather decided to stay at home and care for the children 
of the parties. The trial court's findings in this regard go 
directly to Ms. Black's need for financial assistance in the form 
of alimony. The trial court's findings support a traditional 
alimony award subject to termination upon remarriage, but under 
this Court's decision in Johnson these findings cannot legally 
support the extraordinary nonterminable component of the award. 
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Ms, Black's Assistance in the Dental Practice 
In finding f of paragraph 43, the trial court found that Ms. 
Black's involvement in the dental practice, when needed, was a 
relevant factor. The trial court's finding in this regard is 
relevant to the division of marital property and debt but not 
nonterminable alimony. As will be discussed infra in greater 
detail, the trial court made an inequitable division of martial 
property and debt in favor of Ms. Black. This division included a 
valuation of the dental practice. Therefore, Ms. Black received 
double compensation for her contribution to the dental practice. 
She was first compensated in the form of income derived from the 
practice and consumed by the parties during the course of the 
marriage. She was then compensated again in the division of the 
parties' property and debts, which was grossly inequitable. 
After division of the parties' property and debts, Mr. Barney 
was left with a mountain of debt and his professional degree. The 
trial court has attempted to distribute a portion of his degree to 
Ms. Black in the form of nonterminable alimony. This Court's 
decision in Johnson clearly indicates that Utah law forbids the 
trial court from engaging in a de facto division of a professional 
degree through nonterminable alimony.4 The disparity in earing 
4
 See Petersen v. Petersen. 737 P.2d 237 (Utah App. 1987); see also 
Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538 (Utah 1991) (overturned award of equitable 
restitution based on medical degree); Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1081 
(Utah 1988) (benefit of wife's investment in husband was adequately reflected 
in a greater property settlement and higher alimony); Ravburn v. Ravburn, 738 
P.2d 238 (Utah App. 1987) (disparity in income due to license is adequately 
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capacity between Mr. Barney and Ms. Black may be addressed through 
a traditional alimony analysis and equitable property division but 
not through an award of nonterminable alimony. 
Paragraph n of the trial court's findings states that "this 
award of alimony is not an award of any interest in the 
professional degree of Respondent." In fact, the nonterminable 
alimony component of the alimony award was a de facto division of 
Mr. Barney's professional degree. Merely because the trial court 
calls a spade a club does not make it a club. The above cited 
findings of the trial support a traditional award of alimony that 
terminates upon the recipient spouse's remarriage. This is the 
correct result and the result that the law requires in this case. 
In summary, Mr. Barney does not appeal the alimony award or 
the amount. Mr. Barney only appeals the trial court's 
extraordinary award of nonterminable alimony because it has no 
basis in fact or law. The trial court was required to make 
findings which might support the extraordinary order that alimony 
does not terminate upon remarriage. The trial court failed to make 
such findings and therefore abused its discretion. The 
nonterminable component of the alimony award must be vacated. 
addressed under traditional alimony analysis) 
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II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN THE AMOUNT OF CHILD SUPPORT AWARDED 
The trial court abused its discretion in the amount of child 
support awarded on two grounds. First, in divorce actions where 
combined parental income exceeds the highest statutory table 
amount, evidence must be introduced to establish the reasonable 
needs of the children before the trial court can award child 
support greater than the highest table amount. Ms. Black did not 
introduce evidence regarding the reasonable needs of the children 
and the trial court entered only conclusory findings regarding the 
needs of the children. Second, although required under Utah case 
law, the trial court did not use linear extrapolation to calculate 
the amount of child support. 
A. Ms. Black Did Not Establish the Reasonable Needs of the 
Children. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.12 provides: 
If the combined adjusted gross income exceeds 
the highest level specified in the table, an 
appropriate and just child support amount 
shall be ordered on a case-by-case basis, but 
the amount ordered may not be less than the 
highest level specified in the table for the 
number of children due support. 
In interpreting this statutory provision, in Ball v. Peterson. 912 
P.2d 1006 (Utah Ct. App 1996), this Court stated: 
where the parties1 income exceeds the highest 
monthly combined adjusted gross income listed 
on the statutory table, linear extrapolation 
of the child support obligation table alone is 
not enough. Strict reliance on linear 
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extrapolation would be erroneous, because 
taken to the extreme, a child could be awarded 
support vastly exceeding any reasonable need. 
Rather, a trial judge must consider and make 
specific findings on all "appropriate and 
just" facts. 
Id. at 1014; See also Reinhart v. Reinhart. 963 P.2d 757, 759-60 
(Utah Ct. App 1998). In Reinhart, this Court stated: 
[I]n child support cases where parental income 
exceeds the guidelines, the parties must 
introduce evidence to establish the reasonable 
needs of the children. 
Id. at 760. 
In the instant case, the trial court made the following 
findings regarding the needs of the three minor children: 
24. The parties1 children have become 
accustomed to a high standard of living. 
25. The parties1 children should be given 
support at a minimum to allow them to continue 
their lives with some semblance to what they 
have had in the past. 
26. The children should not be punished 
financially by this divorce. 
27. The children can be and deserve to be 
maintained at their accustomed standard of 
living. They need higher child support than 
the maximum provided by the statutory table. 
28. Respondent is able to pay more child 
support than would be required under statutory 
guidelines. 
R. 848. 
First, with respect to findings 24, 25 and 27, the trial court 
makes a vague reference that the children enjoyed a "high standard 
of living" and "deserve to be maintained at their accustomed 
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standard of living." However, Ball and Reinhart do not allow child 
support to be awarded based on the "standard of living" but rather 
on the "needs of the children." That distinction is critical in 
this case due to fact that the trial court judge and the domestic 
relations commissioner both found that the parties had been "both 
financially and fiscally irresponsible" living an "extremely 
extravagant lifestyle" well beyond their means. R. 149 and R. 995, 
pp. 41-2. In fact, the trial court judge in his bench ruling 
stated: 
Now when we are considering both child support 
and alimony, it's very difficult for me to 
determine what kind of a standard of living 
that, obviously you were living so 
extravagantly that there is no way that 
there's going to be money that you are going 
to be able to maintain anywhere near the kind 
of standard of living that either one of you 
were living before. Just can't do it. 
There's not money there to do it with. 
R. 995, p. 42. The standard is the reasonable needs of the 
children, not an unaffordable extravagant lifestyle that the 
parties improvidently attempted to live. 
Second, Ball and Reinhart require a qualitative or 
quantitative analysis of the children's reasonable needs. Other 
than the findings as noted above, the trial court made no findings 
on the qualitative needs of the children and no evidence was 
presented regarding the same. 
Similarly, the trial court made no quantitative findings on 
the reasonable needs of the children. It is further difficult to 
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marshal evidence from the record on the quantitative needs of the 
children, in that no evidence was presented on that issue. The 
only evidence which comes close is the testimony of Ms. Black on 
her claimed financial needs. Ms. Black introduced exhibit no. 4 0 
as to her living expenses and testimony was elicited from her 
regarding the same. R. 993, pp. 26-31 and 59-78; R. 994, pp. 471-
2. 
It is clear from reviewing exhibit no. 40 and the portions of 
the transcript noted above that the parties were paying exorbitant 
amounts for basic living expenses. For example, housing costs 
including the mortgage payment, taxes, insurance, maintenance and 
utilities, totaled more than $3,712.00 per month. Similarly, Ms. 
Black claimed $715.00 per month for transportation costs for one 
vehicle and $750.00 per month for food costs for four people. 
Noticeably, however, Ms. Black included no amounts in exhibit no. 
40 for special expenses for the children other than that of their 
pro-rata share of the expenses listed. The children were not 
privileged in receiving and the parties were not paying for such 
items as private schooling, special educational needs, lessons, 
extra-curricular activity costs, exotic travel, and lavish gifts. 
In essence, during the marriage of the parties, the children 
experienced a very customary lifestyle enjoyed by other children of 
the general populace. The reasonable needs of the children 
experiencing such a lifestyle can be supported by a standard award 
of child support at the highest table amount. 
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Third, in finding no. 26, the trial court found that the 
children should not be punished financially by this divorce. While 
Mr. Barney agrees with that statement, such is not a factor that 
the trial court can or should consider for the reason that the 
statement also holds true for Mr. Barney. An "appropriate and 
just" award of child support based on relevant factors is the task 
before the trial court, not a determination of who should and 
should not be punished financially because of the divorce. 
Finally, in finding no. 28, the trial court found that Mr. 
Barney had the ability to pay more child support than would be 
required under statutory guidelines. However, in isolation, that 
finding is insufficient to permit an award of child support above 
the highest table amount. In Reinhart, the former wife brought an 
action against the former husband seeking upward modification of 
the child support award based on the increase of the husband's 
gross monthly income. In Reinhart. this Court stated: 
[A] demonstration of an increcise in the 
obligor's income alone is not sufficient to 
increase the child support order. The 
increase in ability to pay must be considered 
in light of the children's actual needs in 
fashioning an "appropriate and just" child 
support award under section 78-45-7.12. 
Id. at 760. In the instant case, finding no. 28 has no relevance 
on this issue unless the court also determines the reasonable needs 
of the children, which the trial court utterly failed to do. 
In summary, Ms. Black failed to introduce evidence to 
establish the reasonable needs of the children. The trial court 
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failed to consider and make specific findings on all "appropriate 
and just11 factors. Accordingly, the child support award should be 
set at no more than the highest table amount. 
B. The Trial Court Did Not Use an Acceptable Method of Linear 
Extrapolation to Calculate the Amount of the Child Support 
Award. 
Assuming arguendo that it is proper in this case for the trial 
court to award child support above the highest table amount, the 
trial court did not use an acceptable method of linear 
extrapolation to calculate the amount of the child support award. 
Linear extrapolation presupposes the use of an accepted method of 
linear regression analysis, such as the "least squares" method, or 
using the actual formula incorporated into the statutory child 
support tables. 
In conjunction with the admission of exhibit no. 15, Mr. 
Barney presented evidence and proposed that child support be based 
on gross monthly incomes of $893.00 for Ms. Black and $10,000.00 
for Mr. Barney. Based on those incomes, the child support award 
would be $1,660.00 per month. 
In its ruling, the trial court did not use a linear regression 
analysis to calculate the amount of child support to be paid by Mr. 
Barney. Rather, the trial court employed a simple ratio method by 
calculating the percentage of child support Mr. Barney would pay if 
his income were $10,000.00 (and Ms. Black had imputed income of 
$893.00) and then used that same percentage, 16.6%, and applied it 
to the gross monthly income the trial court ultimately found Mr. 
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Barney to be earning in the amount of $13,500.00. This ratio 
method results in child support of approximately $2,220.00 per 
month. R. 849. 
The trial court did not take any evidence on acceptable 
methods of linear regression analysis. Using the "least squares" 
method of linear regression would, for example, result in a child 
support award less than the amount actually awarded by the trial 
court. When multiplied by the number of years that Mr. Barney will 
be paying child support., the error of the trial court is compounded 
to substantial dollar amounts. 
In summary, the trial court abused its discretion in the 
amount of child support awarded to Ms. Black. The trial court 
failed to make specific findings to establish that the reasonable 
needs of the children necessitated an award of child support 
greater than the highest table amount. Moreover, the trial court 
used an improper method of extrapolation. This Court should vacate 
the trial court's improper award and set child support consistent 
with the highest level of the statutory table. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN AWARDING MS. BLACK JUDGMENTS FOR 
ONE HALF OF THE VALUE OF CERTAIN 
PROPERTY AWARDED TO MR. BARNEY 
Utah law requires that a trial court distribute property in a 
divorce in a fair and systematic fashion. See Burt v. Burt. 799 
P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah Ct. App 1993). The overriding consideration 
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is that the division be "equitable." Id. at 1171. Utah law 
presumes that each party is entitled to all of his or her separate 
property and fifty percent of the marital property. See Hall v. 
Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); see also Burt v. Burt, 
799 P.2d 1166 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). "[0]nce a court makes a 
finding that a specific item is marital property, the law presumes 
that it will be shared equally between the parties unless unusual 
circumstances, memorialized in adequate findings, require 
otherwise." Hall, 858 P.2d at 1022. Therefore, a trial court's 
deviation from an equal division of marital property is an 
extraordinary division that requires unusual circumstances and the 
trial court to make appropriate findings. 
Utah law addresses the division of debt in a similar fashion. 
The trial court must first characterize, as either separate or 
marital, the debt present at the time of trial. The trial court 
must then divide the debt between the parties in a fair and 
equitable manner. See Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1222-23 
(Utah 1980); see also Sinclair v. Sinclair, 718 P.2d 396 (Utah 
1986). The division of marital debt differs from the division of 
marital property in so much as the law does not presume that the 
division of debt must be "equal" to be "equitable". Id. The trial 
court must then make findings, however, on the impact the division 
of debt has on the payor spouse's ability to pay alimony. See 
Wilev v. Wiley, 866 P.2d 547, 551-52 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
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In the instant case, the trial court's division of the marital 
property5 and debt was undeniably grossly unequal. As described in 
the following table, the total net value of the marital property 
and debt was only $8,572.00. If the trial court had equally 
divided the marital property and debt, each party would have 
received $4,286.00 ($8,572.00 -s- 2) of net value. However, Ms. 
Black was awarded property and debt with a positive net value of 
$26,255.00 and Mr. Barney was awarded property and debt with a 
negative net value of $<17,683.00>. Accordingly, Ms. Black was 
awarded $21,969.00 more in net value as compared to which she would 
have received if there had been an equal division ($26,255.00 -
$4,286.00), The trial court then also properly considered the 
impact of assigning Mr. Barney all of the tax debt and made 
allowance for such in the amount of alimony awarded. R. 851. 
Although grossly unequal, Mr. Barney does not necessarily claim 
that the division was inequitable. However, the trial court did 
not stop there. 
Surprisingly, and without any factual or legal explanation, 
the trial court also awarded judgment against Mr. Barney in favor 
of Ms. Black for one-half of the value of the property he was 
awarded. The judgments were in the amount of (i) $8,000.00, 
constituting one-half the net value of the duplex awarded to Mr. 
50ther items of property such as the furniture, furnishings and vehicles 
were divided by the parties on an equitable basis and the trial court approved 
the same. 
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Barney; and (ii) $20,000.00, constituting one-half the total value 
of the dental practice awarded to Mr. Barney. 
The division of the property and debt by the trial court as 
well as the award of the judgments is illustrated as follows: 
Property and Debt Elements 
Dental Practice 
Marital Residence 
(net equity) 
Duplex (net equity) 
IRA 
Taxes 
Subtotal 
Judgment Elements 
Amount for duplex 
Amount for dental practice 
TOTAL 
Total 
Value 
$40,000 
3,600 
<75.483> 
8,572 
$ 8.572 
Awarded to 
Ms. Black 
$24,455 
16,000 
1,800 
26,255 
8,000 
20.000 
$54.255 
Awarded to 
Mr. Barney 
$40,000 
24,455 
16,000 
1,800 
<75.483> 
<17,683> 
<8,000> 
<20.000> 
$<45.683> 
The trial court's rationale in making such an unequal division 
of the marital property and debt as well as the award of $28,000.00 
of judgments was: (i) Ms. Black's contribution of her inheritance 
to the marriage; (ii) Mr. Barney's assumed ability to pay the tax 
debt in the future; and (iii) both parties having consumed, better 
stated wasted, all marital property so that there was literally no 
property to award either party at the time of trial. R. 995, pp. 
56-8 and R. 996, pp. 55-60. As discussed above, the trial court 
relied on these same factors to support the award of nonterminable 
alimony. 
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While the trial court's division of marital property and debt 
such that Ms. Black received a positive value of $26,2 55.00 and Mr. 
Barney received a negative value of $<17/683.00> is cause for 
concern, the trial court's additional award of judgments in the 
amounts of $8,000.00 and $20,000.00 lacks any intelligible legal 
foundation. The trial court attempted to justify such on the same 
basis used to make its unsupportable award of nonterminable alimony. 
The trial court's division of property and debt, particularly in 
light of $28,000.00 of judgments that were awarded out of the thin 
air, is not only inequitable it offends any sense of justice or 
reason. 
The only possible explanation for the trial court's grossly 
inequitable division of marital property and debt is that the trial 
court considered the value of the dental practice that was proffered 
by Ms. Black. Ms. Black's appraiser valued the dental practice at 
$227,000,000 which included goodwill. Despite Mr. Barney's Motion 
in Limine and objections at trial to exclude the consideration of 
goodwill, the trial court referred to Ms. Black's ascribed value in 
paragraph 8(c) of the trial court's findings by stating "there was 
substantial evidence that the dental practice has the value assigned 
by Petitioner's appraiser of two hundred twenty seven thousand 
dollars ($227,000.00) which included goodwill." The trial court's 
apparent consideration of that value was clear error. This Court 
has made it clear that Utah law does not permit the valuation of a 
sole practitioner's practice unless the professional has retired and 
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sold the practice. See Sorenson v. Sorensen, 839 P.2d 774, 775-76 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
In summary, the trial court's award of judgments for one half 
of the value of certain property awarded to Mr. Barney constituted 
a grossly inequitable property division and lacks any intelligible 
basis in law. The judgments should be vacated. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Barney respectfully requests this 
Court to order that (i) Ms. Black's alimony award terminate on 
remarriage; (ii) child support be awarded at the highest statutory 
table amount; and (iii) the judgments in the amounts of $8,000.00 
and $20,000.00, entered as a part of the property division of the 
trial court, be vacated. 
DATED: April 3, 2000 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
DEAN C. ANDREASEN 
MATTHEW A. STEWARD 
Attorneys for 
Respondent/Appellant/Cross Appellee 
V. Craig Barney 
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Facsimile: (801)322-0592 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHERISEROUNDY, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
V.CRAIG BARNEY, 
Respondent. 
FINDING OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSION OF LAW 
Civil No. 974900793 DA 
Judge Stanton M. Taylor 
JUN 
Petitioner's Complaint for Divorce was heard on October 27, 1998 and October 
29, 1998 before the Honorable Stanton M. Taylor, District Judge presiding. 
Petitioner was present and represented by her attorney Steve S. Christensen. 
Respondent was present and represented by his attorney Dean Andreasen. 
The court having received and considered all of the evidence presented by way of 
testimony and exhibits and having reviewed all memoranda and arguments presented by 
both attorneys, now enters its: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
A. THE COURT FINDS THAT THE PARTIES HAVE STIPULATED AND AGREED AS FOLLOWS 
AND THAT THIS STIPULATION IS REASONABLE AND IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE MINOR 
CHILDREN: 
1. The parties were married on June 6, 1974 and were divorced by way of an 
order of Bifurcation November 16, 1997. 
2. The parties will share joint legal custody of the minor children. Petitioner 
will have the primary physical custody, care and control of the minor children, subject to 
reasonable rights of visitation of the Respondent described as follows: 
a. Petitioner will always have the children during the first half of the 
Christmas vacation including Christmas day. The Respondent will have the 
second half of the Christmas vacation including News Years Day. This 
way the children will not have to travel on Christmas Day. 
b. Petitioner will always have the children during the Easter Holiday and 
during the Utah Spring Break. 
c. The Respondent will have the children during the UEA break that they have 
from school in the fall each year. He will also have the children for Labor 
day and Memorial Day. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law 
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d. Petitioner will always have the children for the 24th of July, as they do not 
celebrate this in Montana. 
e. Respondent will always have the children during the week of the 4th of 
July. He has the option to use some of his summer vacation during that 
time. He has a total of four weeks he can spend with the children during 
the summer. Basketball camps in Montana will be taken into consideration 
as these are important to the children. 
f. Respondent will have the children for Thanksgiving during the ODD years. 
g. Petitioner will have the children for Thanksgiving during the EVEN years, 
h. Tht panics vull try to cooperate with one amothn in Ihc stiiiiiiici months 
and try to get the children to participate in extended family reunions 
whenever possible. Trading July 4th or July 24th to allow for family 
reunions will be acceptable. If a family reunion conflict exists in the 
summer, the parties will alternate taking the children: Petitioner will have 
the children during the 1st conflict time and Respondent will have the next, 
etc. 
i. Respondent has the option of scheduling his visitation on 3-day weekends if 
it works into his schedule, so he will be able to see the children longer on 
Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law 
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his trips to Utah. Petitioner has second option on 3-day weekends (except 
Labor Day and Memorial Day, which Respondent already has.) If Cherise 
desires to have the children on one of these minor holiday weekends, for a 
special event, then Respondent will try to arrange a different time to see the 
children that month. Petitioner will let Respondent know of any such 
problems as soon as possible. Respondent will try to be as flexible with 
these minor holiday changes as his work schedule permits. 
j . On months that do not have minor holidays, Petitioner will permit the 
children to miss one day of school on a Monday to visit with Respondent, 
provided he calls the school and arranges it with them. Respondent must 
also have the children bring their schoolwork with them so they can return 
to school on Tuedsay and not be behind. 
k. Respondent will provide a proposed summer schedule by the prior April 15 
which will give Petitioner time to arrange any desired changes. Petitioner 
will have until April 30 to reply to the summer schedule. The parties will 
submit any dispute they cannot resolve regarding visitation to mediation 
with the parties sharing the costs thereof initially. The ultimate cost of 
mediation may be allocated differently by the court. 
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1. Annie will arrange her own exceptions to this schedule with Respondent. 
The other children will also have the right to work things out with 
Respondent if there are conflicting school activities. 
m. Respondent w ill try to give Petitioner visitation schedules at least six 
months but not more than one year in advance. Respondent has already 
submitted his proposed schedule for 1999 attached as Exhibit 'A'. 
n. Petitioner will always have two weeks to agree to or to suggest changes to 
any visitation schedule Respondent sends her. This two week time period 
will begin from the day Petitioner first receives the visitation schedule by 
certified mail. If Petitioner does not pick up the certified mail, it will be 
presumed that she received it five days after Respondent's mailing is post 
marked. 
o. Family emergencies, Weddings, Funerals, etc. will take precedence over 
the visitation schedule. Respondent and Petitioner will work together to 
allow each other as much notice as possible for these things. Respondent 
will make all changes in the visitation schedule in writing 45 days in 
advance. Petitioner will have two weeks to reply to suggested changes. 
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p. The parties shall implement, as applicable, the advisory guidelines set forth 
in Utah Code Annotated §30-3-33, a photocopy of which is attached as 
Exhibit CB\ 
3. The parties have stipulated that the personal property has been evenly 
divided and the parties will each retain the personal property presently in then-
possession, except that the Respondent will be awarded the hot tub, together with the 
electrical box, stairs and accessories for the hot tub, installed at the Ogden property. 
4. The parties' daughter, Angelina Cherise Barney, age 17, is driving one of 
the parties' vehicles. The parties agree to give title to such vehicle to their daughter, 
Angelina, within thirty days of the signing of this order. 
5. The parties agree to the value of their real property as appraised as follows: 
The value of the marital residence in Ogden, Utah is two hundred sixty eight thousand 
dollars ($268,000.00) and the value of the Bozeman, Montana duplex is two hundred and 
six thousand dollars ($206,000.00). 
6. The parties stipulate that the payoffs on the mortgages as of October 26, 
1998 are as follows: The payoff on the Ogden home is two hundred forty three thousand 
five hundred forty four dollars and sixty seven cents ($243,544.67) and the payoff on the 
Montana duplex is one hundred and ninety thousand dollars ($190,000.00) as of October 
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31, 1998. The equity at the time of trial in the duplex is sixteen thousand dollars 
($16,000.00). The equity at the time of trial in the marital residence in Ogden, Utah was 
twenty four thousand four hundred fifty five dollars thirty three cents ($24,455.33) minus 
all costs necessary to get that residence out of foreclosure, including but not limited to 
property taxes, late fees, interest, attorney's fees and court costs. 
7. The parties stipulate that the Respondent will provide a health insurance 
program for the minor children of the parties covering hospital doctor, medical expense 
incurred by the children. The cost of this insurance will be evenly divided between the 
parties. Further, the parties will each pay one-half of all out-of-pocket reasonable and 
necessary medical, dental and orthodontia expenses paid to arid lor third parties and not 
covered by said insurance. 
8. This stipulation is fair and reasonable and in the best interests of the minor 
children. 
B. THE COURT MAKES THE FOLLOWING FINDINGS BASED ON THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED 
AT TRIAL: 
Life Insurance 
1. Respondent is able to and should maintain the two hundred fifty thousand 
dollar ($250,000.00) life insurance policy on his life now in effect for the benefit of the 
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Petitioner and the minor children of the parties, naming the Petitioner as the beneficiary. 
After child support terminates, then life insurance should be maintained for the benefit of 
Petitioner with the face amount of one hundred twenty five thousand dollars 
($125,000.00) during the period of time Respondent may be liable for alimony. 
INHERITANCE 
2. Petitioner received an inheritance of one hundred and twenty five thousand 
dollars ($125,000.00) from her grandfather during the marriage. 
3. The petitioner's inheritance from her grandfather was commingled by her 
with the parties' marital assets and was not maintained as her separate property: 
a. Fifty three thousand dollars ($53,000.00) of that inheritance came in 
small amounts spread over time between 1988 and 1996. 
b. In 1991, Mrs. Roundy received a lump sum distribution of forty 
seven thousand dollars ($47,000.00) of her inheritance which was 
commingled with the parties' marital assets and/or used to pay 
marital family expenses. 
c. Finally, in 1996, Petitioner received an inheritance distribution of twenty 
five thousand dollars ($25,000.00) which was commingled with the parties' marital assets 
and/or used to pay marital family expenses. This inheritance was used in lieu of the four 
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thousand dollars ($4,000.00) a month Respondent had otherwise taken from the practice 
and given to Petitioner for the family's regular living expenses, including but not limited 
to food, household items, gas, medical copayments, clothes, school expenses, gifts, 
entertainment, travel, grooming and miscellaneous expenses. 
Dental Practice 
4. The court finds that the tangible assets of the Respondent's dental practice 
are marital property. 
5. The dental equipment is the only tangible asset of the dental practice and is 
marital property. The current amount of dental practice accounts receivable approximate 
the current amount of dental practice accounts payable as evidenced by Exhibit numbers 
25 and 26 and, accordingly, net each other out. A list of the dental equipment is attached 
as Exhibit ' C hereto, and made a part of these findings. 
6. The dental equipment has a current value of forty thousand dollars 
($40,000.00). This is the value assigned to the equipment by Respondent. 
7. The present value of the dental equipment assets of the dental practice 
should be evenly divided between the parties: twenty thousand dollars ($20,000 00) to 
each party. 
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8. The court could not consider the following equities in dividing the dental 
assets because of the decision of Sorenson v. Sorenson. 839 P2.d 774 (Utah 1992): 
a. Petitioner contributed all of her inheritance from her grandfather to 
the family's expenses in lieu of taking funds from the dental practice for that purpose. 
b. The court does not find a specific value in regards to the dental 
practice because of the decision in Sorenson v. Sorenson. 839 P.2d 774 (Utah 1992). The 
court cannot consider the value of goodwill and reputation of Respondent's dental 
practice. Although only forty thousand dollars ($40,000.00) of the value of the dental 
practice is divisible as marital property, there was substantial evidence that the dental 
practice has the value assigned by Petitioner's appraiser of two hundred twenty seven 
thousand dollars ($227,000.00) which included goodwill. 
c. The parties have the following education and work experience: 
i. Respondent completed three years of his bachelor's degree 
prior to the marriage, 
ii. Petitioner attended college prior to the marriage of the parties, 
iii. The parties were married in June 1974. 
iv. Respondent was accepted to dental school at the University of 
Iowa beginning the 1974-1975 school year. Respondent's 
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first year of dental school was accepted as credit for the 
fourth year of his bachelor's program and he was awarded his 
bachelor's of science degree in 1975. 
v. Respondent' s dental schooling at Iowa was paid for by the 
United States Air Force through a health professional 
scholarship. Respondent's books, tuition and fees were paid 
and Respondent received a $400.00 per month stipend. Both 
parties worked part-time jobs during schooling to supplement 
the parties income. 
vi. Respondent was awarded his dental degree ml 978. 
vii. Respondent also attended the Oregon Health Science 
University from 1982 to 1984 and was awarded a certificate 
in periodontics in 1984. 
viii. Petitioner left her university studies in Utah to go with 
Respondent to an out-of-state dental school. 
ix. At the time the parties began having children, the parties 
agreed that Petitioner would stay home to care for the 
children and the household. Petitioner spent twenty three 
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years of the marriage supporting Respondent by caring for 
Respondent, raising the parties' five children, and caring for 
the household while Respondent pursued schooling and 
developed his career. Petitioner stayed at home with the 
children throughout the marriage and did not obtain formal 
schooling or work experience. 
x. Petitioner has worked sporadically in Respondent's dental 
practice substituting for regular office employees and as a 
dental assistant when necessary. Petitioner also helped 
Respondent set up and decorate his office. 
Real Property 
9. The Montana duplex should be awarded to Respondent at a value of 
$16,000.00. Respondent currently resides in the Montana duplex while Petitioner 
resides in Ogden, Utah. 
10. The Montana duplex is marital property. One-half of the equity of the 
Montana duplex should be awarded to Petitioner in the amount of eight thousand dollars 
($8,000.00). 
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11 There is not any value in tlic marital residence in Ogden, Utah because the 
home went into foreclosure. Respondent has indicated that he desires to give a deed in 
lieu of foreclosure to the current mortgagee which would result in no equity in that 
property. 
12. However, the marital residence in Ogden, Utah should be awarded to 
Petitioner in the event that she may be able to secure any assistance to save the home 
from foreclosure. If any liens for marital debts are attached to the home, Respondent 
should be ordered to pay such debts, hold Petitioner hannless from payment of such debts 
and indemnify Petitioner relative to any payment she makes towards such debts on the 
marital residence in Ogden, Utah. 
IRA 
13. The IRA of the parties in the amount of three thousand dollars ($3,600.00) 
held at Piper Jaffrey under account #522-12670-220 is marital property. 
14. The court finds that Respondent should pay and has paid one half of said 
IRA account to Petitioner in the cash amount of approximately $1,800.00. 
Debt Division 
15. Respondent should be ordered to pay all of the parties' past due Internal 
Revenue Service debt for the years 1995 and 1996, to hold Petitioner harmless therefrom 
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and to indemnify Petitioner for any payment she makes thereon. The IRS debt for 1995 
is three thousand five hundred fourteen dollars ($3,514.00). The IRS debt for 1996 is 
sixty two thousand three hundred twelve dollars ($62,312.00). All 1997 and 1998 taxes 
were filed separately by the parties and each party is responsible for any tax debt on 
income reported on such separate returns by him or her for those years. 
16. Respondent should be ordered to pay all of the parties' past due state tax 
debts for the year 1996, to hold Petitioner harmless therefrom and to indemnify Petitioner 
for any payment she makes thereon. The Montana State Tax debt for 1995 is paid in full. 
The Montana State Tax debt for 1996 is nine thousand six hundred fifty seven dollars 
($9,657.00). All 1997 and 1998 taxes were filed separately by the parties and each party 
is responsible for any tax debt on income reported on such separate returns by him or her 
for those years. 
17. In reaching its finding that all tax debt payments should be made by 
Respondent, the Court has considered the following factors, which the court also finds: 
a. The income from which the taxes are assessed was earned 
Respondent; 
b. The Respondent alone has the earning ability to pay such tax 
liability; 
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c. Petitionei contiibuted her inheritance of one hundred twenty five 
thousand dollars ($125,000.00) to the marital estate; 
d. Respondent was primarily in control of the family finances during 
the marriage while the taxes were bemg incurred 
18. The parties should each bear his or her own debt for the vehicle each is 
driving as each party is awarded his or her vehicle. 
19. The parties should each pay the mortgages on the real property awarded to 
him or her. 
20. If Petitioner is able to keep the marital residence in Ogden, Utah, 
Respondent will be responsible to pay current all real property taxes for all years prior to 
and including 1998, in the amount of eighty eight hundred dollars ($8,800.00) plus 
interest after October 31, 1998, in order to enable Petitioner to refinance such property, 
consistent with the court's order from the January 11, 1999 hearing in this case II 
Petitioner is not able to retain the marital residence in Ogden, Utah, Respondent should 
be ordered to hold Petitioner harmless against collection of any delinquent real property 
taxes on the marital residence in Ogden, Utah. 
a The temporary order of the court i equired Respondent to pay the real 
property taxes on the martial residence in Ogden, Utah. 
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b. Respondent did not make the tax payments as ordered. 
c. Respondent alone has the ability to make the past due property 
tax payments on the marital residence in Ogden, Utah. 
21. Respondent is ordered to pay all marital debt incurred prior to April 1997 
not specifically addressed under paragraphs 15 through 20 above, to hold Petitioner 
harmless therefrom and to indemnify Petitioner for any payment she makes thereon. 
Except as otherwise ordered by this court, Petitioner is ordered to pay all debts separately 
incurred by her since her bankruptcy in 1998. Respondent is ordered to pay debts 
separately incurred by him after March, 1997 in addition to the other debts assigned to 
him by the court. This order of marital debt payment is made, considering the following 
equities: 
a. The Respondent alone has the ability to pay such marital debts; 
b. Petitioner contributed her inheritance of one hundred twenty five 
thousand dollars ($125,000.00) to the marriage; 
c. Respondent was primarily in control of the family finances during 
the marriage while the marital debts were being incurred. 
22. The order that Respondent pay marital debt on behalf of the Petitioner is 
made by way of further support and maintenance for the Petitioner and is not to be 
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considered a property settlement. Respondent should be ordered to hold Petitioner 
harmless therefrom and to indemnify Petitioner for any payment she makes thereon. 
Child Support 
23. The parties have three minor children1 Angelina Cherise, 12/21/82; Sandin 
Craig, 9/18/85; and Fabione Sadie Marcella, 12/19/87. Respondent should pay support 
for these children until each attains age 18 or graduates from highschool, whichever 
occurs last. 
24. The parties' children have become accustomed to a high standard of living. 
25. The parties' children should be given support at a minimum to allow them 
to continue their lives with some semblance to what they have had in I lie past. 
26. The children should not be punished financially by this divorce. 
27. The children can be and deserve to be maintained at their accustomed 
standard of living. They need higher child support than the maximum provided b> the 
statutory table. 
28. Respondent is able to pay more child support than would be required under 
statutory guidelines. 
29. Respondent can and should pay an amount equal to sixteen point three 
percent (16.6%) of his cuiTent pretax income as child support. 
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30. Respondent's gross income after he pays his business expenses is thirteen 
thousand five hundred dollars ($13,500.00) per month average. Respondent should pay 
child support of $2,220.00 a month, initially, calculated as follows: 
a. Using a sole custody worksheet, if Petitioner has a gross monthly 
income of $893.00 and Respondent has the highest gross monthly 
income on the table of $10,000.00, child support would be $1,660.00 
or approximately 16.6 percent of the highest gross monthly income 
on the child support table for Respondent. Extrapolating this 
percentage to Respondent's actual gross monthly income of 
$13,500.00 results in child support of approximately $2,220.00 per 
month ($13,500.00 x 16.6 percent). Child support shall be 
recomputed using the same methodology when there is a change in 
circumstances under Utah law. 
b. Child support shall continue for a child until the child attains the age 
of 18 years or graduates from high school with his or her regular 
class, whichever is later. 
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Alimony 
31. Although Petitioner is enrolled at Weber State University and is entitled to 
pursue her education, it is not reasonably likely she will eventually be able to earn 
sufficient income to support hei and her family in the lifestyle she enjoyed during the 
parties' marriage. 
32. Petitioner has a need for alimony in an amount greater than Respondent has 
the ability to pay. 
a. The parties lived an extravagant and expensive lifestyle. 
b. Petitioner does not have the ability to support herself at the same 
expensive level she has had in the marriage. 
33. Respondent earns an average of thirteen thousand five hundred dollars 
($13,500.00) in income each month after his business expenses. 
34. Respondent is self employed as a periodontist in Bozeman, Montana. 
Although he closed his second office in Layton, Utah in 1997, Respondent continued to 
make an income equivalent to or greater than the income he had with two practices. 
35. Respondent's ability to pay alimony to the Petitioner is limited by the 
following: 
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a. Respondent should be required to pay income taxes for state, federal 
and self employment on his entire income. The taxes on thirteen thousand 
five hundred dollars ($13,500.00) a month, without any deduction for 
alimony, will be four thousand eight hundred fifty five dollars ($4,855.00). 
After Respondent pays these taxes he will have eight thousand six hundred 
and sixty five dollars ($8,665.00) of disposable income each month. 
b. After Respondent pays two thousand two hundred and twenty dollars 
($2,220.00) of child support, he will have six thousand four hundred and 
forty five dollars ($6,445.00) of disposable income each month. 
c. Respondent can make payments of three thousand dollars 
($3,000.00) per month to the IRS and other creditors in order to resolve the 
unpaid marital obligations. After this payment, Respondent will have only 
three thousand four hundred and forty five dollais ($3,445.00) of disposable 
income each month. 
d. Respondent will be permitted one thousand four hundred forty five 
($1,445.00) a month for his own needs and living expenses. 
36. Respondent's ability to pay alimony presently is limited to two thousand 
dollars ($2,000.00) per month for five years because of the debt responsibilities the court 
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has assigned to Respondent. Respondent should be ordered to pay alimony of two 
thousand dollars ($2,000.00) per month for five years. 
37. Respondent submitted expenses of $3,700.00 a month as his reasonable 
living expenses and needs in Trial Exhibit 14. The court specifically finds that of the 
amount claimed, $100.00 a month will be paid by Petitioner as her share of the children's 
health insurance premium. The Respondent's visitation trip to see the children will not 
be necessary because under paragraph 54 below the court will permit the children to 
travel to Montana by bus. For three children to travel to Montana by bus, Respondent's 
cost will be $240.00 a month. 
38. Even if Respondent's reasonable living expenses and needs are equivalent 
to the remaining three thousand three hundred forty dollars ($3,340.00) which 
Respondent claims in Trial Exhibit 14, the court finds that he has sufficient income to 
provide for those needs. 
39. Any funds needed for Respondent's reasonable needs and living expenses 
in addition to the living expenses allowed by the court in subparagraph 35(d) above, may 
be taken from discretionary expenses in his business that will no longer be needed, 
including the income that had previously gone to the following: Travel to and 
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expenses for Respondent's Layton office, attorneys fees for the divorce, off-site 
accoimting expenses, travel to and expenses for implantation courses and Respondent's 
practice's automobile. 
40. After five years from the date of the entry of decree, Respondent will have 
an increased ability to pay additional alimony. Respondent has the ability to pay off 
Internal Revenue Service auearage and other marital debts within five years which pay 
off will reduce his expenses by three thousand dollars ($3,000.00) a month. 
41. After five years from the date of the entry of decree, Respondent should be 
ordered to increase his alimony payments to a total alimony payment of three thousand 
dollars ($3,000.00) per month because he will have an additional ability to pay alimony 
after he pays off the marital debts. 
42. Based upon the courts' memorandum decision dated January 28, 1999, a 
portion of the alimony awarded to the Petitioner should be non-terminable, even if 
Petitioner remarries or cohabits, as follows: 
a. If Petitioner remarries or cohabits for the first time, before five years 
from the date the Order regarding Property and Support Issues 
Pursuant to Divorce is signed, the Petitioner's alimony should 
immediately be lowered from the amount of alimony provided in 
Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law 
Page 22 
853 
paragraph 36 above to one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500.00) 
a month. After five years from the date such Order is signed, 
Petitioner's alimony should be raised to $2,000.00 per month, 
b. If Petitioner remarries or cohabits for the first time after five years 
from the date the Order regarding Property and Support Issues 
Pursuant to Divorce is signed, the Petitioner's alimony should be 
lowered from the amount of alimony provided above in paragraph 41 
above to the amount of $2,000.00 per month. 
43. Non terminable alimony is appropriate under the facts of this case because: 
a. Although the Petitioner was pursuing a college degree at the time of 
the parties' marriage, she set aside her personal and educational 
pursuits in order to raise five children, to be at home with them, to 
maintain the household and to enable and assist Respondent in 
obtaining his professional degree as well as develop his professional 
skills. 
b. The Petitioner devoted all of her attention to raising the family and 
supporting the Respondent during her twenty three years of marriage 
to the Respondent. 
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c. Both parties had approximately equal earning capacity, education 
and experience going into the marriage. During the marriage, 
Petitioner was not able to advance her earning abilities because of 
her support of the family and of Respondent's professional education 
and business. 
d. Respondent was able to obtain a dental degree, a graduate degree in 
dentistry, acquire seventeen (17) years of dental experience and 
establish his own private practice, giving him the earning ability of 
$13,500.00 a month, all with the support of the Petitioner. 
e. Both parties were equal contributors in advancing Respondent's 
educational training. 
f. Petitioner assisted in the dental practice when needed. 
g. Petitioner has minimal earning capacity and no marketable skills. It 
is not likely given her age of forty three (43) years that Petitioner 
will be able to ever attain the skills or earning capacity to support 
herself at the standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage. 
h. Petitioner contributed $125,000.00 of her inheritance into the 
marriage. 
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i. The parties spent all of the money that Respondent earned. The 
parties are left with virtually no assets to be divided among them at 
the end of the marriage, 
j . The parties have no retirement benefits or savings other than an IRA. 
k. Petitioner is entitled to a non-terminable award of alimony because 
of her contribution to Respondent's increased earning capacity 
during the marriage. 
1. The only way to provide the Petitioner a compensating adjustment 
for her contribution to the greatly enhanced earning capacity of the 
Respondent is to award her non-terminable alimony, 
m. Non-terminable alimony will be necessary to maintain Petitioner at a 
standard of living similar to that which existed during the marriage, 
n. This award of alimony is not an award of any interest in the 
professional degree of Respondent. Respondent's income from his 
practice may change without affecting the amount of alimony he 
pays to the Petitioner. 
o. Respondent has the ability to pay non terminable alimony which is 
less than the court ordered alimony in paragraphs 36 and 41 above. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law 
Page 25 
856 
44. The alimony provided in paragraphs 36, 41 and 42 should continue until 
April 30, 2021, this being the length of the marriage of the parlies from the date of 
divorce. Non-terminable alimony will terminate on the death of either party. 
Tax Exemptions 
45. The Respondent should be permitted to claim the children as tax 
exemptions. 
Attorneys Fees 
46. Petitioner should be awarded her attorney's fees, expert witness fees and 
costs requested at trial. 
47. Respondent has the ability to pay Petitioner's fees ordered in this paragraph 
as part of the judgment awarded to Petitioner below. 
48. Petitioner does not have the ability to pay her attorney's fees. 
49. Respondent has the ability to pay the attorney's fees requested by Petitioner 
at trial. 
50. However, Respondent does not have the ability to pay Petitioner's 
attorney's fees and costs incurred at trial over the amount estimated in Petitioner's 
Attorney's Fee Affidavit as follows: attorney's fees of $1,100.00 and costs of $392.00. 
Respondent does not have the ability to pay attorney's fees and costs incurred by 
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Petitioner after trial for the preparation of post trial memoranda on non-terminable 
alimony and the Findings of Fact among other post trial work in the amount of 
$15,400.00. 
51. The court finds that one hundred and twenty dollars ($120.00) per hour 
charged for Mr. Christensen's work is reasonable. 
52. Mr. Christensen's time spent in this case through trial was necessary and 
reasonable in order to adequately represent Petitioner. 
53. The amount of attorney's fees requested at trial are reasonable and 
necessary as follows: 
a. Petitioner's attorney's fees requested at trial were twelve thousand 
seven hundred dollars ($12,700.00); and in addition 
b. Petitioner's expert witness fees are one thousand five hundred 
iser,•six hundred fifty fiwdulldis ' dollars ($1,500.00) for the dental practice appra  _, 
($562.50) for trial preparation and testimony by Petitioner's accountant and three 
hundred dollars ($300.00) for J. F. Pingree the accountant who consulted with 
Petitioner's attorney in preparing this case for trial; and in addition 
c. Petitioner's costs are five hundred ninety three dollars and twelve 
cents ($593.12) for deposition transcripts, Exhibits and court fees. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law 
Page 27 
858 
Visitation 
54. The children should be permitted to travel to their father's home for 
visitation by bus as long as such travel is made without causing the children to have to 
transfer buses. 
55. Respondent may supply the court with alternative travel proposals. 
56. Respondent should pay for all visitation travel expenses. 
57. Respondent is the only party able to pay for visitation travel expenses. 
Judgment 
58. The requested offsets to Petitioner's judgment against Respondent should 
be allowed as follows: 
a. All of Respondent's attorneys fees of two thousand five hundred and 
fifty dollars ($2,550.00) for the May 18, 1998 hearing should be paid by 
Petitioner. 
i. The Commissioner made a specific finding that attorneys fees 
for the May 12, 1998 hearing were Petitioner's responsibility, 
ii. It would be reasonable for Petitioner to pay Respondent's fees 
for the May 18, 1998 hearing in light of the circumstances. 
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b. Petitioner's share of the medical expenses for the children incurred 
prior to October 29, 1998 in the amount of one thousand nine dollars and 
five cents ($1009.05). 
c. The Petitioner's agreed share of the appraisal paid by Respondent in 
the amount of two hundred dollars ($200.00). 
d. Respondent's one thousand dollar ($1,000.00) payment in 
December, 1997 towards the judgment against him. 
59. After the above adjustments, the prior judgment of the Petitioner should be 
the original amount of eleven thousand eight hundred eighty two dollars and twenty six 
cents ($11,882.26) minus the above credits of four thousand seven hundred fifty nine 
dollars and five cents ($4,759.05) equaling a subtotal of seven thousand one hundred 
twenty three dollars and twenty one cents ($7,123.21). 
60. The original judgment against the Respondent should be increased by the 
following: 
a. If Petitioner is able to retain the marital residence in Ogden Utah, 
Respondent should pay the payments he was ordered to pay under 
the temporary order on the Ogden home mortgage for August, 1998 
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and September, 1998 in the total amount of three thousand four 
hundred ninety dollars and eighty two cents ($3,490.82); 
b. If Petitioner is able to keep the martial residence in Ogden, Utah, 
Respondent should pay the late charges each month on the mortgage 
on the marital residence in Ogden, Utah for his failure to keep the 
mortgage current from June 1, 1997 through October 31, 1998 as 
ordered in the temporary order in the total amount of two thousand 
seventy one dollars and sixty two cents ($2,071.62); 
c. The Petitioner's share of the equity in the Montana property, which 
is eight thousand dollars ($8,000.00); 
d. The Petitioner's attorney's fees of twelve thousand seven hundred 
dollars ($12,700.00); 
e. The Petitioner's costs of five hundred ninety three dollars and twelve 
cents ($593.12); 
f. The Petitioner's expert witness fees of two thousand^ixty two 
dollars and fifty cents ($2,362.50); and 
g. The Petitioner's share of the dental equipment in the amount of 
twenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00). 
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h. If Petitioner is able to keep the marital residence in Ogden, Utah, 
one-half of the parties* equity in the marital residence in Ogden, 
Utah existing at the time her ownership in that home is confirmed. 
This confirmation will be made by the resolution and dismissal of 
pending or threatened foreclosure proceedings against that residence. 
The equity will be the difference between the appraised value of 
$268,000.00 as found in paragraph 5 above and the total amount 
owed on the home, including but not limited to interest, taxes, 
principal on the mortgage and fees, including but not limited to 
attorney's fees, penalties and court costs. 
61. Petitioner's total judgment after adding all enhancements is fifty six 
thousand three hundred forty one dollars and twenty seven cents ($56,341.27) minus one-
half of the marital residence on Ogden, Utah as calculated in paragraph 60h above. If 
Petitioner is not able to keep the marital residence in Ogden, Utah, Petitioner's total 
judgment is fifty thousand seven himdred seventy eight dollars and eighty three cents 
($50,778.83). 
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62. The property taxes for the marital residence in Ogden, Utah are considered 
above in Paragraph 20 and are to be treated separately from and in addition to the 
judgment described in Paragraphs 58 through 61 above. 
63. The total judgment in favor of the Petitioner as well as the property taxes 
for the marital residence in Ogden, Utah shall constitute a lien against Respondent's 
dental practice. If Respondent were to sell the dental practice before the judgment in 
favor of Petitioner is paid, the amount due to Petitioner will be paid out of the sale. 
Petitioner is granted a security interest in the dental equipment currently held by 
Respondent and Respondent shall immediately sign all documentation necessary to 
perfect Petitioner's security interest in the dental equipment. 
64. Respondent will pay the judgment to Petitioner described in Paragraphs 58 
through 61 above in monthly installments as he is able as follows: 
a. In no event shall Respondent pay less than four thousand two 
hundred and twenty dollars ($4,220.00) a month for the first five 
years and five thousand two hundred twenty thousand dollars 
($5,220.00) a month thereafter to Petitioner until all of the above 
judgment plus ongoing support due to her is paid in full. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law 
Page 32 
b. When the oldest minor child is emancipated, the parties will refigure 
the appropriate amount of child support under Paragraph 30 above. 
However, Respondent will continue to pay Petitioner in the same 
amount he would pay for three minor children. The difference 
between the adjusted child support and the amount actually paid will 
be considered a payment toward the judgment Respondent owes to 
Petitioner under the Divorce Decree. 
c. When child support is no longer due, Respondent's payment to 
Petitioner will continue in the same amount as support for three 
children until he has paid the entire judgment in full. This entire 
child support amount will be considered a payment towards the 
Petitioner's judgment against Respondent. 
d. If alimony decreases, Respondent shall continue to pay the full 
amount of alimony ordered by this Court as a payment on the 
judgment until all of the judgment ordered against Respondent is 
paid in foil. All amounts paid by Respondent to Petitioner shall 
accrue interest at the rate provided for by Utah Code Annotated §15-
1-1 for post judgment interest from the date of entry of the Decree 
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and from the date of any prior judgments*. Petitioner is also entitled 
to interest on past due support as provided by Utah law. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The parties were previously granted a Decree of Divorce in an Order of 
Bifurcation. 
Under Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5(8) and Johnson v. Johnson. 855 P.2 250 
(1993), this court has the discretion to award non-terminable alimony based on the 
interests of justice and pursuant to the court's equitable powers. 
All issues between the parties will be ordered in accordance with the Findings 
above. 
^ 
DATED this _ T l _ day of April 1999. 
Approved as to Form 
AArffiYi' • L / I V ^ < M ^ I * / » » * * 
Dean Andreasen 
Attorney for Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing FINDING OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSION OF LAW was mailed, postage prepaid, on the day of March, 
1999 to: 
Dean C. Andreasen 
CLYDE, SNOW, SESSIONS & SWENSON 
Attorneys for Respondent 
201 South Main Street, 13th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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Steve S. Christensen (6156) 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Eagle Gate Tower, Suite 1160 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1004 
Telephone: (801) 322-0591 
Facsimile: (801) 322-0592 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH " "' " "ir 
CHERISE ROUNDY, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
V.CRAIG BARNEY, 
Respondent. 
DIVORCE DECREE 
Civil No. 974900793 DA 
Judge Stanton M. Taylor 
Petitioner's Complaint for Divorce was heard before the court in trial on October 
27, 1998 and October 29, 1998, the Honorable Stanton M. Taylor, District Judge 
presiding. Petitioner was present and represented by her counsel, Steve S. Christensen; 
Respondent was present and represented by his counsel, Dean Andreasen. 
The court having reviewed all of the exhibits admitted by both Petitioner and 
Respondent, having reviewed the law applicable to this matter, having heard argument 
from both counsel, and having previously entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, now enters its: 
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DECREE OF DIVORCE 
The Stipulation of the parties is approved and the parities are ordered to comply 
with such stipulation as follows: 
1. The parties are awarded joint legal custody of the minor children. 
Petitioner will have the primary physical custody, care and control of the minor children, 
subject to reasonable rights of visitation of the Respondent described as follows: 
a. Petitioner will always have the children during the first half of the 
Christmas vacation including Christmas day. The Respondent will 
have the second half of the Christmas vacation including New Years 
Day. This way the children will not have to travel on Christmas 
Day. 
b. Petitioner will always have the children during the Easter Holiday 
and during the Utah Spring Break. 
c. The Respondent will have the children during the UEA break that 
they have from school in the fall each year. He will also have the 
children for Labor day and Memorial Day. 
d. Petitioner will always have the children for the 24th of July, as they 
do not celebrate this in Montana. 
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e. Respondent will always have the children during the week of the 4th 
of July. He has the option to use some of his summer vacation 
during that time. He has a total of four weeks he can spend with the 
children during the summer. Basketball camps in Montana will be 
taken into consideration as these are important to the children. 
f. Respondent will have the children for Thanksgiving during the ODD 
years. 
g. Petitioner will have the children for Thanksgiving during the EVEN 
years. 
h. The parties will try to cooperate with one another in the summer 
months and try to get the children to participate in extended family 
reunions whenever possible. Trading July 4th or July 24th to allow 
for family reunions will be acceptable. If a family reunion conflict 
exists in the summer, the parties will alternate taking the children: 
Petitioner will have the children during the 1st conflict time and 
Respondent will have the next, etc. 
i. Respondent has the option of scheduling his visitation on 3-day 
weekends if it works into his schedule, so he will be able to see the 
children longer on his trips to Utah. Petitioner has second option on 
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3-day weekends (except Labor Day and Memorial Day, which 
Respondent already has.) If Cherise desires to have the children on 
one of these minor holiday weekends, for a special event, then 
Respondent will try to arrange a different time to see the children 
that month. Petitioner will let Respondent know of any such 
problems as soon as possible. Respondent will try to be as flexible 
with these minor holiday changes as his work schedule permits. 
j . On months that do not have minor holidays, Petitioner will permit 
the children to miss one day of school on a Monday to visit with 
Respondent, provided he calls the school and arranges it with them. 
Respondent must also have the children bring their schoolwork with 
them so they can return to school on Tuesday and not be behind. 
k. Respondent will provide a proposed summer schedule by the prior 
April 15 which will give Petitioner time to arrange any desired 
changes. Petitioner will have until April 30 to reply to the summer 
schedule. The parties will submit any dispute they cannot resolve 
regarding visitation to mediation with the parties sharing the costs 
thereof initially. The ultimate cost of mediation may be allocated 
differently by the court. 
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1. Annie will arrange her own exceptions to this schedule with 
Respondent. The other children will also have the right to work 
things out with Respondent if there are conflicting school activities. 
m. Respondent will try to give Petitioner visitation schedules at least six 
months but not more than one year in advance. 
n. Petitioner will always have two weeks to agree to or to suggest 
changes to any visitation schedule Respondent sends her. This two 
week time period will begin from the day Petitioner first receives the 
visitation schedule by certified mail. If Petitioner does not pick up 
the certified mail, it will be presumed that she received it five days 
after Respondent's mailing is post marked. 
o. Family emergencies, Weddings, Funerals, etc. will take precedence 
over the visitation schedule. Respondent and Petitioner will work 
together to allow each other as much notice as possible for these 
things. Respondent will make all changes in the visitation schedule 
in writing 45 days in advance. Petitioner will have two weeks to 
reply to suggested changes. 
Divorce Decree 
Page 5 
p. The parties shall implement, as applicable, the advisory guidelines 
set forth in Utah Code Annotated §30-3-33, a photocopy of which is 
attached as Exhibit 'B' to the Findings of Fact. 
2. Each party is awarded the personal property presently in his/her possession, 
except that the Respondent will be awarded the hot tub, together with the electrical box, 
stairs and accessories for the hot tub, installed at the Ogden property. 
3. The parties' daughter, Angelina Cherise Barney, age 17, is driving one of 
the parties' vehicles. The parries will give title to such vehicle to their daughter, 
Angelina, within thirty days of the signing of this order. 
4. The Respondent is ordered to provide a health msurance program for the 
minor children of the parties covering hospital, doctor, medical expenses incurred by the 
children. The cost of this insurance will be evenly divided between the parties. Further, 
the parties is ordered to each pay one-half of all out-of-pocket reasonable and necessary 
medical expenses paid to or for a provider other than Respondent, not covered by said 
insurance. 
5. Each party is awarded the vehicle in his/her possession. 
6. The base child support shall not be reduced by 50% for time periods during 
which extended visitation occurs for at least 25 of any 30 consecutive days even though 
the statue allows for this reduction. 
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7. A mutual restraining order shall be entered enjoining the parties from 
harassing, abusing or annoying the other party. 
LIFE INSURANCE 
8. Respondent is ordered to maintain the two hundred fifty thousand dollar 
($250,000.00) life insurance policy on his life now in effect for the benefit of the 
Petitioner and the minor children of the parties, naming the Petitioner as the beneficiary. 
After child support terminates, Respondent is ordered to maintain life insurance for the 
benefit of Petitioner naming Petitioner as the sole beneficiary of said insurance policy in 
the amount of one hundred twenty five thousand dollars ($125,000.00) during the period 
of time Respondent owes Petitioner alimony. 
DENTAL PRACTICE 
9. Respondent is awarded his dental practice and the assets and property 
associated therewith subject to the lien of Petitioner pursuant to paragraph 45 below. 
10. One-half of the equity of the dental practice is awarded to Petitioner in the 
amount of twenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00). 
REAL PROPERTY 
11. The Montana duplex is awarded to Respondent. 
12. One-half of the equity of the Montana duplex is awarded to Petitioner in the 
amount of eight thousand dollars ($8,000.00). 
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13. The marital residence in Ogden, Utah will be awarded to Petitioner in the 
event that she may be able to save the home from foreclosure. If any liens for marital 
debts are attached to the home, Respondent is ordered to hold Petitioner harmless from 
such liens on the marital residence in Ogden, Utah. If Petitioner pays any marital debts 
secured by the marital residence, Respondent is ordered to indemnify Petitioner. 
IRA 
14. The IRA of the parties in the amount of three thousand six hundred dollars 
($3,600.00) held at Piper Jaffrey under account #522-12670-220 is marital property. 
Respondent is ordered to pay one half of said IRA account to Petitioner in the cash 
amount of approximately $1,800.00. 
DEBT DIVISION 
15. Respondent is ordered to pay all of the parties' past due Internal Revenue 
Service debt for 1995 in the amount of three thousand five hundred fourteen dollars 
($3,514.00) and for 1996 in the amount of sixty two thousand three hundred twelve 
dollars ($62,312.00), to hold Petitioner harmless therefrom and to indemnify Petitioner 
for any payment she makes thereon. Each party is responsible for any tax debt on 
income reported on such separate returns filed by him or her for the years 1997 and 
thereafter. 
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16. Respondent is ordered to pay all of the parties' past due state tax debts for 
the year 1996 in the amount of nine thousand six hundred fifty seven dollars ($9,657.00), 
to hold Petitioner harmless therefrom and to indemnify Petitioner for any payment she 
makes thereon. Each party is responsible for any tax debt on income reported on such 
separate returns filed by him or her for the years 1997 and thereafter. 
17. If Petitioner is able to keep the marital residence in Ogden, Utah, 
Respondent is ordered to pay current all real property taxes for all years prior to and 
including 1998, in the amount of eighty eight hundred dollars ($8,800.00) plus interest 
after October 31, 1998, in order to enable Petitioner to refinance such property, consistent 
with the court's order from the January 11, 1999 hearing in this case. If Petitioner is not 
able to retain the marital residence in Ogden, Utah, Respondent is ordered to hold 
Petitioner harmless against collection of any delinquent real property taxes through 1998 
plus interest on the marital residence in Ogden, Utah and is ordered to indemnify 
Petitioner for any payments she makes towards such taxes and interest. 
18. Respondent is ordered to pay all marital debt incurred prior to April 1997 
not specifically addressed under paragraphs 14 through 16 above, to hold Petitioner 
harmless therefrom and to indemnify Petitioner for any payment she makes thereon. 
19. Respondent is ordered to pay debts separately incurred by him after March, 
1997 in addition to the other debts assigned to him in this Decree. 
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20. Respondent is ordered to make payments of three thousand dollars 
($3,000.00) per month to the IRS and the State of Montana in order to resolve unpaid 
marital obligations. 
21. Except as otherwise ordered in this Decree, Petitioner is ordered to pay all 
debts separately incurred by her since her bankruptcy in 1998. 
22. The parties will bear his or her own debt for the vehicle each is driving. 
23. The parties are ordered to pay the mortgages on the real property awarded 
to him or her except as set out in other paragraphs in this decree. 
24. The order that Respondent pay marital debt on behalf of the Petitioner is 
made by way of further support and maintenance for the Petitioner and is not to be 
considered a property settlement. 
CHILD SUPPORT 
25. Respondent is ordered to pay child support for the parties three minor 
children: Angelina Cherise, 12/21/82; Sandin Craig, 9/18/85; and Fabione Sadie 
Marcella, 12/19/87. 
26. Respondent is ordered to pay child support of $2,220.00 a month, initially, 
calculated as follows: 
a. Using a sole custody worksheet, if Petitioner has a gross monthly income of 
$893.00 and Respondent has the highest gross monthly income on the table 
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of $10,000.00, child support would be $1,660.00 or approximately 16.6 
percent of the highest gross monthly income on the child support table for 
Respondent. Extrapolating this percentage to Respondent's actual gross 
monthly income of $13,500.00 results in child support of approximately 
$2,220.00 per month ($13,500.00 x 16.6 percent). Child support shall be 
recomputed using the same methodology when there is a change in 
circumstances under Utah law. 
b. Child support will continue for a child until the child attains the age 
of 18 years or graduates from high school with his or her regular 
class, whichever is later. 
27. Respondent is ordered to pay his child support obligation in no more than 
two equal installments no later than the 5th and 20th days of the month. 
28. Respondent is ordered to pay any monthly transaction fee for income 
withholding of his child support obligation by Office of Recovery Services. 
ALIMONY 
29. Respondent is ordered to pay alimony of two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) 
per month for five years. 
30. Respondent is ordered to pay income taxes for state, federal and self 
employment on his entire income of thirteen thousand five hundred dollars ($13,500.00) a 
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month, without any deduction for alimony, in addition to his obligations for marital debts 
and child support ordered above. 
31. After five years from the date of the entry of the Divorce Decree, 
Respondent is ordered to increase his alimony payments to a total alimony payment of 
three thousand dollars ($3,000.00) per month. 
32. Based upon the courts' memorandum decision dated January 28, 1999, a 
portion of the alimony awarded to the Petitioner will not terminate if Petitioner remarries 
or cohabits. In the event of marriage or cohabitation by Petitioner, Respondent is ordered 
to pay alimony as follows: 
a. If Petitioner remarries or cohabits for the first time, before five years 
from the date the Divorce Decree is entered, the Petitioner's alimony 
will immediately be lowered from the amount of alimony provided 
in paragraph 29 above to one thousand five hundred dollars 
($1,500.00) a month. After five years from the date such Decree is 
entered, Petitioner's alimony will be raised to $2,000.00 per month. 
b. If Petitioner remarries or cohabits for the first time after five years 
from the date the Divorce Decree is entered, the Petitioner's alimony 
will be lowered from the amount of alimony provided above in 
paragraph 31 above to the amount of $2,000.00 per month. 
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33. The alimony provided in paragraphs 29, 31 and 32 will continue until 
April 30, 2021, this being the length of the marriage of the parties from the date of 
divorce. Regular and non-terminable alimony will terminate on the death of either party. 
TAX EXEMPTIONS 
34. The Respondent will be awarded the right to claim the children as tax 
exemptions each year so long as Respondent is current on all obligations to Petitioner and 
his children under this Divorce Decree. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
35. Petitioner is awarded her attorney's fees, expert witness fees and costs 
requested at trial as follows: 
a. Petitioner's attorney's fees requested at trial were twelve thousand 
seven hundred dollars ($12,700.00); and in addition 
b. Petitioner's expert witness fees are one thousand five hundred 
dollars ($1,500.00) for the dental practice appraiser, five hundred 
sixty two dollars and fifty cents ($562.50) for trial preparation and 
testimony by Petitioner's accountant and three hundred dollars 
($300.00) for J. F. Pingree the accountant who consulted with 
Petitioner's attorney in preparing this case for trial; and in addition 
Divorce Decree 
Page 13 
c. Petitioner's costs are five hundred ninety three dollars and twelve 
cents ($593.12) for deposition transcripts, Exhibits and court fees. 
36. Petitioner's Motion for Additional Attorney's Fees at Trial for fees and 
costs of $1,492.00 included in her attorney fee affidavit which was submitted prior to the 
last day of trial is denied. Attorney's Fees for post trial matters is denied in the amount 
of $14,400.00, including her fees for preparation of the briefs, which were requested by 
the court on the issue of non-terminable alimony, for her preparation of the Findings and 
Decree and for the hearing on the Findings. 
VISITATION 
37. The children may travel to their father's home for visitation by bus as long 
as such travel is made without causing the children to have to transfer buses. 
38. Respondent may supply the court with alternative travel proposals. 
39. Respondent is ordered to pay for all visitation travel expenses. 
JUDGMENT 
40. Respondent will be allowed the requested offsets for past due alimony and 
attorney's fees to Petitioner's judgment against Respondent in the prior amount of eleven 
thousand eight hundred eighty two dollars and twenty six cents ($11,882.26) as follows: 
a. All of Respondent's attorneys fees of two thousand five hundred and 
fifty dollars ($2,550.00) for the May 18, 1998 hearing. 
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b. Petitioner's share of the medical expenses for the children incurred 
prior to October 29, 1998 in the amount of one thousand nine dollars 
and five cents ($1009.05). 
c. The Petitioner's agreed share of the appraisal paid by Respondent in 
the amount of two hundred dollars ($200.00). 
d. Respondent's one thousand dollar ($1,000.00) payment in 
December, 1997 towards the judgment against him. 
e. If Petitioner is able to keep the marital residence in Ogden, Utah, 
one-half of the equity in the marital residence in Ogden, Utah 
existing at the time her ownership in that home is confirmed. This 
confirmation will be made by the resolution and dismissal of 
pending or threatened foreclosure proceedings against that residence. 
The equity will be difference between the appraised value of 
$268,000.00 as found in paragraph 5 of the Findings of Fact and the 
total amount owed on the home, including, but not limited to 
interest, taxes, principal on the mortgage and fees, including but not 
limited to attorney's fees, penalties and court costs. 
41. The above credits are four thousand seven hundred fifty nine dollars and 
five cents ($4,759.05) plus Respondent's share of the equity of the marriage residence in 
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Ogden, Utah, referred to above in paragraph 40e, if applicable. After the adjustment, the 
prior amoimt of the Petitioner's judgment of will be adjusted from eleven thousand eight 
hundred eighty two dollars and twenty six cents ($11,882.26) to a new amoimt of seven 
thousand one hundred twenty three dollars and twenty one cents ($7,123.21) minus the 
Respondent's share of the equity of the marriage residence in Ogden, Utah, referred to 
above in paragraph 40e, if applicable. 
42. In addition to adjusted judgment against the Respondent, Respondent is 
ordered to pay and Petitioner is awarded an additional judgment for the following: 
a. If Petitioner is able to retain the marital residence in Ogden Utah, 
Respondent will pay the payments he was ordered to pay under the 
temporary order on the Ogden home mortgage for August, 1998 and 
September, 1998 in the total amount of three thousand four hundred 
ninety dollars and eighty two cents ($3,490.82); 
b. If Petitioner is able to retain the martial residence in Ogden, Utah, 
Respondent shall pay the late charges each month on the mortgage 
on the marital residence in Ogden, Utah for his failure to keep the 
mortgage current from June 1, 1997 through October 31, 1998 as 
ordered in the temporary order in the total amount of two thousand 
seventy one dollars and sixty two cents ($2,071.62); 
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c. The Petitioner's share of the equity in the Montana property, which 
is eight thousand dollars ($8,000.00); 
d. The Petitioner's attorney's fees of twelve thousand seven hundred 
dollars ($12,700.00); 
e. The Petitioner's costs for trial of five hundred ninety three dollars 
and twelve cents ($593.12); 
f. The Petitioner's expert witness fees of two thousand three hundred 
sixty two dollars and fifty cents ($2,362.50); and 
g. The Petitioner's share of the value of the dental practice in the 
amount of twenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00). 
43. Petitioner is awarded a total judgment after adding all enhancements of fifty 
six thousand three hundred forty one dollars and twenty seven cents ($56,341.27) minus 
Respondent's share if any as defined above in paragraph 38e of the equity in the marital 
residence in Ogden, Utah. 
44. The property taxes for the marital residence in Ogden, Utah are considered 
above in Paragraph 17 and are to be treated separately from and in addition to the 
judgment described in Paragraphs 40 through 43 above. 
45. The total judgment in favor of the Petitioner as well as the property taxes 
for the marital residence in Ogden, Utah shall constitute a lien against Respondent's 
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dental practice. If Respondent sells the dental practice or any part thereof before the 
judgment in favor of Petitioner is paid, the amount due to Petitioner is ordered to be paid 
out of the sale. Petitioner is granted a security interest in the dental equipment currently 
held by Respondent and Respondent is ordered to immediately sign all documentation 
necessary to perfect Petitioner's security interest in the dental equipment. 
46. Respondent is ordered to pay the judgment to Petitioner described in 
Paragraphs 40 through 43 above in monthly installments as he is able and at least in the 
following amounts: 
a. When the oldest minor child is emancipated, the parties are ordered 
to refigure the appropriate amount of child support under Paragraph 
26 above. However, Respondent is ordered to continue to pay 
Petitioner in the same amount he would pay for three minor children. 
The difference between the adjusted child support and the amount 
actually paid will be considered a payment toward the judgment 
Respondent owes to Petitioner under the Divorce Decree. 
b. When child support is no longer due, Respondent is ordered to make 
payments to Petitioner in the same amount as support for three 
children until he has paid the entire judgment in full. This entire 
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child support amount will be considered a payment towards the 
Petitioner's judgment against Respondent. 
c. If Petitioner remarries or cohabits, resulting in decreased alimony, 
Respondent is ordered to continue to pay the same amount he was 
ordered to pay for alimony as though the cohabitation or remarriage 
did not occur. However, the difference between the amount paid and 
the alimony ordered by the court under this Decree will be 
considered a payment towards the Petitioner's judgment against 
Respondent. 
d. In no event shall Respondent pay less than four thousand two 
hundred and twenty dollars ($4,220.00) a month to Petitioner in 
support and judgment payments for the first five years after the 
signing of the Decree and five thousand two hundred twenty dollars 
($5,220.00) a month to Petitioner in support and judgment payments 
thereafter until all of the above judgment plus ongoing support due 
to her is paid in full. 
e. All amounts paid by Respondent to Petitioner shall accrue interest at 
the rate provided for by Utah Code Annotated §15-1-1 for post 
judgment interest from the date of entry of the Decree and from the 
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date of any prior judgments. Petitioner is also entitled to interest on 
past due support as provided by Utah law. 
47. The parties shall execute such documents as may be necessary to transfer 
the property as awarded by the Court to the party entitled thereto. 
DATED this U day of A^j4, 1999. 
BY THE COURT: 
Judge7 Stant 
District Co 
Approved as to form 
KUUA r, /jOyvfai 
Dean Andreasen 
Attorney for Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing DIVORCE DECREE was mailed 
first class, postage prepaid on the ^u day of April 1999 to: 
Dean Andreasen 
CLYDE, SNOW, SESSIONS & SWENSON 
Attorneys for Respondent 
201 South Main Street, #1000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
\^$t-/M<*~\, 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF WEBER COUNTY 
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH ^fi 0 J ms 
CHERISE ROUNDY, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
V. CRAIG BARNEY, 
Respondent. j 
MEMORANDUM DECISION^ 
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Following a trial on October 29, 1998, the court took under 
advisement whether nonterminable alimony was appropriate in the 
instant circumstances. Both sides have briefed the issue. 
The state legislature clearly provided that alimony could 
continue beyond the remarriage of the receiving spouse, if the 
divorce decree so specifically provides. Utah Code Annotated, § 
30-3-5(8). The availability of nonterminable alimony has likewise 
been recognized by the Utah Court of Appeals. See Johnson v. 
Johnson, 855 P.2d 250 (1993). In the interests of justice and 
pursuant to the court's equitable powers under § 30-3-5, U.C.A., 
the court finds that the instant case justifies the award of 
nonterminable alimony. See Johnson at 252. 
The decision to award permanent alimony is based on many 
relevant factors. The court makes the following findings: 
Petitioner is in need of alimony. Respondent has the ability to 
pay alimony. Respondent's earning capacity was greatly enhanced 
704 
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through the efforts of both spouses during the marriage. 
Petitioner supported respondent during dental school. Petitioner, 
likewise, supported respondent during the specialized training 
after dental school. Petitioner and respondent worked jointly to 
establish the dental practice. Petitioner dedicated her 
inheritance of $125,000.00 to the marriage, which amount has been 
entirely consumed. There are only minimal marital assets to be 
divided. Petitioner is in a precarious financial position. 
Petitioner has a minimal earning capacity. Petitioner has no 
marketable skills. Petitioner did not pursue additional training 
or work experience in order to support respondent and to raise 
their children. The marriage had a duration of twenty-three 
years. If petitioner were to remarry, she will have essentially 
zero financial security to reflect her twenty-three years of 
dedication to respondent and to their family, constituting a 
restraint on the freedom of petitioner to remarry. Petitioner and 
respondent were accustomed to a high standard of living. Although 
the court considers respondent's ability to provide support (as 
per § 30-3-5(7), U.C.A.), the court specifically does not 
consider the value in respondent's professional degree and the 
good will in his dental practice. 
Accordingly, the court finds that alimony, a portion of 
which will be nonterminable, is justified. Respondent will pay 
alimony in the amount of $2,000.00 per month. After five years, 
the alimony will increase to $3,000.00 (based on respondent's 
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increased ability to pay once tax responsibilities are 
satisfied). If petitioner remarries, the alimony will be 
decreased to $1,500,00, if the five years have not yet passed 
from the entry of judgment, and to $2,000.00, if and when five 
years have passed. The later amount is nonterminable. The court 
will have continuing jurisdiction to modify alimony based on a 
substantial material change in circumstances not freseeable at 
this time. 
The ruling of the court on October 29, 1998 is hereby 
amended, as necessary, by this decision. Mr. Christensen will 
please prepare an appropriate order. 
Dated this day of January, 1999. 
ylor, Judge 
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1 and then decide if the children need that expense. 1 
2 believe the children in this case do need that expense. 
3 The parties have created those needs including housing, 
4 food, and the other expenses that they have acquired a life 
5 style for and that amount will be a short term amount of 
6 less than seven years. 
7 And, your Honor, I would indicate to the Court, 
8 by Ms. Roundy having real property, she is able to take 
9 that as a tax deduction which gives her $600 a month in 
10 savings. So whatever the concern about having expensive 
11 housing, her taxes would go up by that amount by not having 
12 that housing and I think that does offset any concern of 
13 the reasonableness of the housing. It's not, the standard 
14 is not adequate housing, it's housing at the level that 
15 these parties are used to living. Thank you for your 
16 attention. 
17 THE COURT: We'll be in recess for about five 
18 I minutes. 
19 (Whereupon a recess was taken.) 
20 THE COURT: I guess if it was easy, you wouldn't 
21 be here, would you? The problem is that I didn't bring my 
22 baby cutting sword. What is it that W.C. Fields said, "All 
23 I things considered, I'd rather be in Philadelphia". I'm 
24 going to go through this and it's going to take us a little 
25 time because 1 do have some questions as we go along. 
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1 To make an observation to begin with. 1 am 
2 finding and I'm sure this is not going to be any great 
3 shock to anyone, that the parties and their standard of 
4 living was an extremely extravagant one. In fact, I don't 
5 recall ever seeing a case where people would go through the 
6 amount of money that you folks have gone through and not 
7 have anymore to show for it than what you have to show for 
8 it. I mean it's a shame, it's a, I don't know how you did 
9 it. I'm not sure that you know. But to have gone through 
10 the kind of gross, I mean here you are grossing in excess 
11 of $400,000 a year and whether we find your overhead was 
12 60% or 50% that's still means, you know, somehow you're 
13 burning up $160 to $180,000 and not even paying taxes and 
14 not buying anything of substance. I mean you bought two 
15 homes. You bought one here in Ogden, but you don't have 
16 any substantial equity in it, in fact, the default debts 
17 probably far exceed any equity that you have in the house. 
18 I And you have a little equity in the one up in Montana but 
19 that's a shame, not to mention $125,000 that was the 
20 inheritance and the Court, by the way, finds in fact that 
21 that was commingled. It became a martial asset and was 
22 blown right along with all of the rest of the money that 
23 was coming in. I feel really bad about this because I 
24 don't think there's anyway we can really do justice. 
25 Regardless of what I do, I don't think there is anyway that 
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1 1 can do justice just based upon the fact that you-folks 
2 have blown an opportunity to invest. You ought to be 
3 millionaires. You know, with the kind of money you were 
4 J making, you ought to be millionaires. Gees, how many 
5 I people have an opportunity of getting $125,000 cash handed 
6 to them? And to blow it and not have anything to show for 
7 it, that's, I don't understand. I don't understand. 
8 Unfortunately, you are going to have to suffer by reason of 
9 that. 
10 Now when we are considering both child support 
11 and alimony, it's very difficult for me to determine what 
12 kind of a standard of living that, obviously you were 
13 living so extravagantly that there is no way that there's 
14 going to be money that you are going to be able to maintain 
15 anywhere near the kind of standard of living that either 
16 one of you were living before. Just can't do it. There's 
17 not money there to do it with. 
18 | Well, let's get started at the beginning of these 
19 things and see if I can kind of deal with them with what 
20 we've got. The Court, of course, had previously granted 
21 I the divorce so I'm not going to have to be concerned about 
22 that. We bifurcated that issue. That the Court finds that 
23 the stipulation of parties concerning the custody of the 
24 children and the visitation schedule, I find that is 
25 reasonable and order that that be incorporated into the 
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1 findings of decree. I'm going to encourage both of you, I 
2 think both of you are going to go away feeling dissatisfied 
3 and upset. Please, be upset at me, that's okay. That's 
4 what they pay me my magnificent salary for. But please 
5 I don't take it out on your kids. You know, they are the 
6 real victims. You two, I suppose, get what you deserve. 
7 You know, you made the choices you made but please, 
8 understand those kids have to feel good about both of you 
9 J in order for them to feel good about themselves. If you 
10 want your kids to go through a real identity crisis, tear 
11 down the other parent in front of them because that's the 
12 quickest way in this world I can think of doing it. You 
13 know, you're going to have to make a decision which is most 
14 important to you, your love of your children or your anger 
15 and hate of each other. If you don't give a damn about the 
16 kids then keep tearing each other down. That's a good way 
17 to end up with kids who are having problems. So please 
18 I don't do that. Please consider the love of your children. 
19 The Court awards each party the personal property 
20 presently in their possessions as was stipulated between 
21 the parties with one exception. I think that was the hot 
22 tub. The hot tub goes to Dr. Barney. 
23 I In finding that the $125,000 became marital 
24 property and was flittered away, that the Court also finds 
25 that, you know, normally the income tax that would have 
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been a debt of the parties but somehow it only seems fair 
to me that the doctor should pay that debt. So, he has the 
3 I tax debt. 
4 The IRA, what I would prefer to say, you know, 
5 I each one of them is entitled to half of it. The concern I 
6 have is that if they cash it out there is going to be an 
7 additional tax liability and I think we want to avoid as 
8 much of the taxes as we possibly can. And if there is some 
9 way, is it in the Doctor's name at the present time? 
10 I MR. ANDREASEN: It is. But under the Internal 
11 Revenue Code it can be transferred to her tax free. What 
12 she does with it from there, of course, is her decision. 
13 THE COURT: That would be to her decision. 
14 I MS. ROUNDY: May I say something? I told my 
15 lawyer not to mention the IRA because it's not our money. 
16 It's my in-laws money and I don't want any of it. It's 
17 their money. So, just leave it for them. 
18 | THE COURT: All right. No. Divide it. Divide 
19 it. And let's do it so that it is a tax free thing so that 
20 she gets her share and then she can do with it what she 
21 wants to do. And I suppose if she wanted to give it back 
22 to his parents, she could do that. 
23 Okay. The Court, of course, is going to award to 
24 him the dental practice. I think that makes sense. You're 
25 going to have to remind me. There was a specific amount of 
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equity in the property in Montana. 
MR. ANDREASEN: $206 minus 190, so approximately 
3 I $16,000. 
4 THE COURT: $16,000? Okay. All right. We will 
5 I award that property to him since it's up there. I wonder— 
6 I'll come back to that. 
7 The Court finds in accordance with my previous 
8 ruling that the value of the practice would be $40,000. I 
9 recognize that there is some problems with that. I really 
10 do have some heartburn over it. So that everybody will 
11 understand that I do have some sympathy for the fact that 
12 the petitioner in this case had spent 23 years of her life 
13 | helping to develop the practice, supporting him so that he 
14 would be able to do the development the practice even to 
15 the extent of the $125,000 that either went to expenses or 
16 assisted in building up the practice. And then to say the 
17 only thing she would be entitled to is half the physical 
18 | assets of the business, I really do have some problems with 
19 that. But, I think I'm bound by what the Supreme Court has 
20 said and I, for a long time, have felt like, that the value 
21 of his education ought to be a marital asset. But, once 
22 I again, the Supreme Court don't agree with me and I'm bound 
23 by the law as it is, not as I would necessarily like it to 
24 I be. So the Court will divide that $20,000 to each. Well, 
25 J rather than saying to each at this point, I'm going to say 
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1 the value of the asset is $40,000. 
2 Now the Court would award to each party the 
3 vehicles that they have in their possession subject to the 
4 debts. And the van, as I understood, the daughter is now 
5 I driving that. Is that the 22 year old that's away from 
6 home ? 
7 DR. BARNEY: Your Honor, the van was repossessed. 
8 THE COURT: Oh, it was repossessed. That's 
9 right. 
10 DR. BARNEY: It's a 1990 Dodge Dynasty that she 
11 is driving, yes. 
12 THE COURT: Pardon me? 
13 DR. BARNEY: A 1990 Dodge Dynasty. That's what 
14 she is driving. That's the other vehicle. 
15 THE COURT: Is there a debt on that? 
16 DR. BARNEY: No, there is not. 
17 THE COURT: Free and clear. 
18 DR. BARNEY: A $1,400 car. 
19 THE COURT: Do you have any problem with her 
20 keeping that? Okay. Then we'll let each of you keep your 
21 own cars and pay for them and we'll let the daughter keep 
22 the other car. 
23 The Court will allow as offsets the things that 
24 I have been stipulated to; the $1,000 payment, the appraisal, 
25 the insurance premiums, medical costs for the kids. 
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And on the attorney's fees on the contempt, I 
think where the commissioner made that specific finding and 
3 I recommendation and the Court, in view of all of the 
4 circumstances, feels like that was probably an appropriate 
5 recommendation so the Court will affirm that and allow that 
6 also as an offset against the judgment which he had granted 
7 to the petitioner on the back due support. I think it was 
8 back due alimony, wasn't it? 
9 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yes. 
10 THE COURT: All right. The difficult issue and 
11 that's the support and alimony. 
12 MS. ROUNDY: What does that leave on the judgment 
13 then? 
14 THE COURT: Well, let's total the whole thing up 
15 when we get to the end because there are going to be some 
16 other things back and forth because we haven't dealt with 
17 I the attorney's fees, your request for attorney's fees on 
18 J the total hearing and in view of the cash situation of the 
19 I parties I am going to award some attorney's fees and we'll 
2 0 get to the amount in a little while but it would be my 
21 intention to add that to the previous judgment along with 
22 some other things that I think are appropriate there. And 
23 | while I'm thinking about that specific issue, the Court is 
24 I granting the petitioner a lien against the dental practice 
25 for the amounts of the judgment which I think will deal 
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1 with the bankruptcy issue. 
2 Let me ask a question just in the interest of 
3 information. And I suppose I could get this if I went to 
4 the exhibits. The respondent is encouraging the Court to 
5 go with the $1,660 permanent support obligation. 
6 Presumably that would be the three children and that would 
7 be based upon, is $1,660 based upon the maximum figure on 
8 the schedule or is there some extrapolation it's imputed 
9 on? 
10 MR. ANDREASEN: No, it's based upon $10,000 of 
11 gross income from him, minimum wage for her. 
12 THE COURT: I see. Okay. 
13 On the visitation and travel for visitation, that 
14 is the responsibility of the respondent and buses are okay. 
15 Once again, thevdifficult part relates to the 
16 evaluation of what would be an appropriate amount of child 
17 support and alimony. The Court believes that the maximum 
18 would probably not be an appropriate figure, the $1,660. 
19 So, what I've done is extrapolate it. And I figured that 
20 $1,660 support for $10,000 figures out at about 16%. In 
21 figuring his income times the 16%, I come up with a figure 
22 of $2,220 child support, and once again that's just the 
23 extrapolation. We'll follow the same formula when the next 
24 child becomes of age. In other words we would go back and 
25 figure the $10,000 and then figure 16% based upon the same 
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application for two children instead of three and then one 
child so they can kind of have the formula. The Court is 
3 I basing that figure on a monthly income of $13,500 which is 
4 based on a gross net of $162,000. 
5 I Now, I have to tell you that the Court was 
6 somewhat impressed by one of the proposals of the 
7 petitioner which related to decreases in some of the 
8 expenses that have been forecast for previous years, some 
9 decreases in travel expense and education expense and 
10 automobile expense. The Court did not factor in the 
11 requested depreciation because I think there is an 
12 offsetting cost of the purchase of new equipment on an 
13 ongoing basis from the income that's available. 1 have not 
14 I added those amounts to the $162,000, but what I have done 
15 is assumed in some of the subsequent figures that he would 
16 have more disposable income to pay amounts that I'm going 
17 to order for him to pay. So the basis for the $2,220 was 
18 | $13,500 plus minimum wage imputed to petitioner. 
19 I In figuring alimony the Court is making this 
20 specific finding that that the petitioner has a real need 
21 for alimony to support her and the Court recognizes that 
22 the doctor does not have the ability to support her to the 
23 extent that they were living previously to their 
24 I separation. But nonetheless, that he has an obligation 
25 based upon his earning capacity to provide some degree of 
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security and to a degree that she would not be capable of 
supporting herself. So I'm finding that she has a need, 
that she does not have the ability to provide that for 
herself and that he does have some ability to provide 
assistance for her. In computing the alimony, once again I 
start out with the base of 13.5 per month and I deduct from 
the 13.5 the taxes that he damn well better pay on an 
ongoing basis. In fact, that's one of the astonishing 
things. I can't imagine anybody not paying their taxes. I 
don't understand that. So, I figure $4,855 is the tax 
figure for both Federal and State taxes based upon, you 
know, projected incomes. So, I'm deducting $4,855, which 
would be his tax liability which leaves an amount of 
$8,645. The Court recognizes that he is going to have to 
have to be paying on the horrendous amount of back taxes 
which will also include the taxes for calendar year 1998 
that he hasn't been paying anything on now. So what I'm 
going to do is give him another deduction from the $8,645 
to take into account the fact that he is going to have to 
pay off the IRS. I am, I am, well, I deducted $3,000 per 
month for that purpose and I'm convinced that he is going 
to have to pay at least $3,000 a month on that obligation 
to the IRS. That leaves an amount of $5,645 dollars and 
what I'm in essence doing is dividing that between the 
parties to kind of equalize their income. So, I'm going to 
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1 require him to pay to her the sum of $2,823 per month 
2 alimony. I'm going to require that figure for a period of 
3 five years, which would be the amount of time that it's 
4 going to take him to pay off the tax liability. At the end 
5 I of the five year period, I am ordering that that sum be 
6 increased by the sum of $1,000 so that in five years he is 
7 going to pay $3,823. And that that would be a permanent 
8 alimony award. 
9 MR. ANDREASEN: Your Honor, I must have missed a 
10 figure, I'm sorry. Where did the child support come into 
11 that computation? I must have missed that. 
12 THE COURT: No, I didn't factor that in. I 
13 J didn't. Well, back to the drawing board. Okay, back to 
14 the old drawing board. We'll start out once again with the 
15 base of $13,500. We take off this tax obligation which is 
16 $4,855, that leaves us $8,645, then we substract from that 
17 the child support obligation of $2,220 and that leaves us, 
18 if my mathematics are correct, with $6,425. Now, if we 
19 deduct from that the $3,000 that he's going to have to pay 
20 on his ongoing tax obligation, that's going to leave a 
21 balance of disposable income of about $3,425. My initial 
22 feeling was that we should at that point divide the 
23 disposable income equally. I don't think that is going to 
24 work. So, what the Court is going to do is award her a 
25 $2,000 alimony and encourage the doctor to make adjustments 
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to that figure taking into account the items that were 
raised by the petitioner in reducing travel, education, 
3 I automobile expense, that sort of thing. And I feel like 
4 under those circumstances that we'll be able to pretty well 
5 equalize the income where he has an obligation of $2,220 
6 child support and $2,000 alimony. 
7 MS. ROUNDY: Well, why don't you subtract it from 
8 the $15,000 a month he's been making for the last two years 
9 instead of $13,500? 
10 THE COURT: Well, let's see, where was I? Then 
11 as I was saying after a five year period when the tax 
12 responsibility will have been taken care of. The Court 
13 I will order that that $2,000 increase to the sum of $3,000 
14 and the $3,000 figure at that point would become permanent. 
15 The Court, and I don't know what the exact figures are 
16 going to be because I don't, you know, we have the 
17 judgment, the previous judgment less the offsets. And then 
18 | we're going to have to include $8,000 which would be her 
19 share of the Montana property, $20,000 for her share of the 
20 practice, and the Court is finding that the request for 
21 attorney's fees and costs is a reasonable one and that the 
22 judgment will include those four figures. 
23 J On payment of the judgment, the Court is going to 
24 order that as this will be an interest bearing judgment but 
25 I don't think it would be appropriate at this point to make 
52 
it executable. I don't think we ought to execute on the 
practice although I am ordering that she have a lien 
against the practice for the amount of the judgment. 
As child support is reduced by reason of children 
becoming emancipated, either by achieving their 18th 
birthday or graduating from high school with their regular 
class whichever occurs last, that he start paying the 
amount of child support reduction. In other words, I want 
her to still get the same amount of money but he'll be 
paying that against the judgment. 
MR. ANDREASEN: Would you say that one more time, 
Judge? 
THE COURT: In other words, let's assume where 
child support of $2,220, let's say that the child support 
reduces by $600 when the first child comes of age. We will 
continue to pay that $2,220 but the $600 will be applied 
against the judgment. And then the second child the same 
thing, the third child the same thing until the judgment is 
paid in full. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Your Honor, the ultimate 
alimony was going to be $3,823. 
THE COURT: Yes, but I neglected to factor in the 
fact that he was also paying out $2,220. I had forgotten 
to factor that in. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Right. But that will drop off 
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1 about that same time, two years later. 
2 THE COURT: I'm sorry? 
3 MR. CHRISTENSEN: The child support will 
4 completely had dropped off two years after that by your 
5 I adjustment. This is no longer a factor. The Court is 
6 saying the ultimate long term alimony is only going to be 
7 $3,000 in 2.3 years? 
8 THE COURT: That's right. Have I overlooked 
9 anything? 
10 MR. ANDREASEN: I'm sorry, your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: Have I overlooked anything? 
12 MR. ANDREASEN: Again, I do have a number of 
13 J points of clarification that 1 need to ask but I don't know 
14 if you're finished or not. 
15 THE COURT: Oh, please do. That's why I like to 
16 rule from the bench so that we can talk about it. 
17 MR. ANDREASEN: Some standard things, let me make 
18 sure that Dr. Barney will continue to pay or to maintain 
19 the medical insurance and the parties will equally share 
20 the cost. 
21 THE COURT: Medical insurance, equally share, yes 
22 the statutory language on the medical. 
23 MR. ANDREASEN: Okay. The alimony will terminate 
24 upon statutory events. 
25 THE COURT: That's right. 
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are not being far maybe with 
Mr. Burgy, I think they can live there probably for a 
period of time free. I'm not sure that that is fair to 
him. But the bankruptcy, of course, will tie it up. That 
may allow her sufficient time to find other suitable 
housing. 
THE COURT: That'd be nice. 
MS. ROUNDY. You didn't give me a thing. You 
gave it all to him. (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: Okay. He gets the tax deductions. 
He is required to maintain life insurcince. I don't think 
$100,000 is adequate. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: I believe he has a policy of 
$200 or $350 in effect. 
MR. ANDREASEN: $250. 
THE COURT: $250? All right. Let's have her be 
the beneficiary of that at least until the child support 
ends and then half of that probably. 
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1 MR. ANDREASEN: What was your decision on the 
2 home, I'm sorry? Our proposal? 
3 THE COURT: Well, it's awarded to her for — 
4 (Over talking) 
5 MR. ANDREASEN: Just a couple of other questions, 
6 I have. I believe under the case law, the Rhinehart case 
7 in particular. There needs to be a specific finding of 
8 J need beyond the table. Are you making findings as to needs 
9 for the children for purposes — 
10 THE COURT: As a matter of fact, the children 
11 have been maintained at an extremely high level and I think 
12 they have come to expect and probably deserve to be 
13 maintained at a fairly high level. I just don't feel it's 
14 appropriate to punish them anymore than they are being 
15 punished by reason of the fact of the divorce and I think 
16 he has the capability of paying child support in the 
17 increased amount and I think the increased amount is 
18 | minimum to keep them going at least in an assemblance of 
19 I what they've had before. 
20 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Your Honor, — 
21 MR. ANDREASEN: Oh, excuse me. I had a few 
22 others. The next question would be dealing the elements of 
23 the judgment. As I understood, if I understood correctly, 
24 you are adding $20,000 to the judgment for H of the hall, 
25 or excuse me, the dental practice. 
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1 THE COURT: That's right. 
2 MR. ANDREASEN: $8,000 for H of the duplex. 
3 THE COURT: That's right. 
4 MR. ANDREASEN: So she's getting benefit of all 
5 of the property settlement, the assets side but he is 
6 picking up all of the tax liability? 
7 THE COURT: Yes. 
8 J MR. ANDREASEN: Okay. 
9 THE COURT: I think that's what I said. There 
10 were a couple of things that I considered in that. Even 
11 though the $125,000 became a marital asset, I just, and 
12 there was another factor, well, both parties have pointed 
13 the finger at the other as being the responsible party for 
14 the extravagant life style. I recognize that it probably 
15 isn't both of them but they're involved somewhat. 
16 Although, this is probably the primary responsibility for 
17 the money. That was another factor that I considered in 
18 | ordering that he, you know, pick that up. I just felt like 
19 I from the stand point of the equities, that ought to be his 
20 responsibility and then, of course, his ability to pay on 
21 those he's going to pay. You know, there was a lot of 
22 discussion earlier, too, about the commissioner's order 
23 I concerning her having to work. I haven't made any order 
24 I concerning that. I feel like she's going to have to make 
25 J her own decisions about that. I think it would be great 
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for her to go back and get her education and try to develop 
some skills. The real heartburn I'm having about the whole 
thing is just exactly what her outburst was, you know, I'm 
not really getting anything. She's right. And the primary 
reason is because there isn't anything there to give her. 
That's primarily the problem. Now, they've absolutely 
blown away everything that they had. 
Why don't you ask your attorney first and if it's 
something that should be brought to my attention, I'll be 
glad to consider it. 
Those are some of the factors that the Court was 
considering in assigning, and assessing that 
responsibility. 
MR. ANDREASEN: I believe the final question that 
I had was regarding attorney's fees. I'm not quite sure 
what — 
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attorney's fees to? 
THE COURT: Pardon me? 
MS. ROUNDY: Attorney feefs to? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. ANDREASEN: Could I just observe that there 
was an order in place for Dr. Barney to pay the property 
taxes on the Ogden home which are now $8,800 in arrears. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. ANDREASEN: I thought I told (inaudible) all 
about that. 
THE COURT: Well, let's put it this way. I'm 
going to order that he hold her harmless if any claim is 
made against her for those fees because the commissioner 
did assign that responsibility to him. And I'm not going 
to require her to pay them. If a claim is made against her 
where she is required to then I'll order him to hold her 
harmless. And once again that wouldn't become a part of 
that judgment which constitutes a lien against the 
practice. 
MR. ANDREASEN: I'm just trying to think through 
it quickly. Would that be a personal, those taxes only 
attach to the property itself. I don't believe under Utah 
law she would ever have any obligation personally. 
THE COURT: Yes, well, if that's the case then I 
guess we won't have to worry about it. 
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MR. ANDREASEN: Okay. 
2 THE COURT: But, once again, now see there may be 
3 a contractual responsibility and if that is the case, and 
4 if a claim were made against her, based upon the contract 
5 I of sale between Mr. Burgy and them, then that would be his 
6 problem, Dr. Barney's problem. Yes. 
7 MR. CHRISTENSEN: The Court has awarded her the 
8 property and should she lose the property only because of 
9 I the $8,800 in which she is in arrears, how does the Court 
10 want to deal with that problem? 
11 THE COURT: In other words, you feel like there 
12 is a possibility she might be able to keep the property if 
13 | he were to pay to her the amount of the back due taxes? 
14 MR. CHRISTENSEN: I don't know what her position 
15 is but I would think she would probably want to try. 
16 THE COURT: Do you want to be heard on that? 
17 MR. ANDREASEN: Well, I believe it's 
18 | unaffordable. I mean we were talking $3,700 of monthly 
19 cost on that thing. The Court order will be in the 
20 neighborhood of $4,200 and $2,000, I mean $3,500 of $4,200 
21 in support is going to be just for the home. It just is 
22 not affordable. The practical solution is deed it back 
23 over, let somebody else worry about the property taxes and 
24 I get her into acceptable housing. 
25 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Your Honor, I think it should 
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1 be up to her. 
2 THE COURT: It is. And I think what he was doing 
3 is talking the practical side. Candidly, — 
4 MS. ROUNDY: I, — 
5 THE COURT: — part of the extravagance is the 
6 house. I can't imagine. But, if there is a possibility of 
7 her being able to save the home through someone assisting 
8 J her or something like that then I would order him to pay 
9 them. 
10 MS. ROUNDY: Can I say something? 
11 THE COURT: Why don't you say it to your attorney? 
12 MS. ROUNDY: I think I can ask it better. 
13 I THE COURT: (Inaudible.) 
14 MR. CHRISTENSEN: If your Honor is willing, I 
15 would be willing to at least pass on what she wants to say. 
16 THE COURT: Sure. 
17 I MR. CHRISTENSEN: Her concern is that alimony 
18 I will terminate if she ever remarries and she'll absolutely 
19 I get nothing. And her request to the Court is that there be 
2 0 made some property element of the alimony to let it 
21 continue in that situation. 
22 THE COURT: If you can tell me how to do that, 
23 J counsel, I'd be delighted to. And I mean that sincerely. 
24 I That's one of the problems of the case, you know, and I 
25 recognize that up front. I do. And if there was a way of 
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1 accomplishing that I would be delighted. 
2 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Well, I mean there is a way to 
3 make that happen and that is by awarding her a marital 
4 property division at $2,000 for five years and $3,000 a 
5 month for (inaudible). 
6 MR. ANDREASEN: You're already getting half the 
7 property and we're getting all the debt, all the taxes. 
8 MS. ROBERTSON: I know but that's 23 years of my 
9 life. 
10 THE COURT: That's the concern. It's not just 
11 today. What we are doing is talking ten years from now and 
12 the alimony award obviously is saying to her, you can never 
13 remarry. 
14 MS. ROUNDY: I know it is. It's saying my life 
15 ended when I — 
16 MR. ANDREASEN: It's Utah law. 
17 THE COURT: Well, I understand. Well, I'll tell 
18 I you what. I'll, why don't we prepare the necessary 
19 j findings, conclusions, and decree and I'll hold under 
20 advisement that specific issue of how to deal with this so 
21 that she has a property interest as opposed to something 
22 else. But, I'm afraid, lfm kind of afraid that the 
23 Appellate Court's are probably going to say, you know, a 
24 I rose by any other name is still a rose. 
25 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Well, I think there are a lot 
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1 of equitable interests in this case and — 
2 THE COURT: Well, there are but the equitable 
3 interests has been pretty well resolved by the Supreme 
4 Court contrary to your client's best interest and, you 
5 know, I really sympathize. I have to tell you, I really 
6 sympathize, but if you'll submit to me some authorities on 
7 that issue, supply counsel a copy of them, give him an 
8 opportunity to respond, I'll be glad to consider that, that 
9 particular request. 
10 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Thank you. 
11 THE COURT: Maybe we ought to establish some time 
12 limitations so that we can reach, you know, so there can 
13 I finality because we do need to have this final and the 
14 parties get on with their lives. 
15 I MR. ANDREASEN: I'd be happy to give the first 
16 shot at the findings, conclusions, and decree, if that's 
17 acceptable. 
18 | THE COURT: Is that okay? 
19 I MR. CHRISTENSEN: My client would prefer that I 
20 try that. 
21 THE COURT: Well, all right. Go ahead. 
22 MR. CHRISTENSEN: All right. 
23 THE COURT: And we'll reserve this other issue 
24 I and could you say within about maybe 14 days or something 
25 I submit me some authorities? 
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THE COURT: You bet. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: In terms of the bus travel of 
the children, there is a concern about a bus transfer being 
required and having the children being out in the middle of 
the night. If that is something that the Court is 
concerned about, could it be a one way trip without an 
exchange of buses if he is going to use ground 
transportation? 
THE COURT: I think that would probably be in the 
best interests of everyone. 
MR. ANDREASEN: We would certainly stipulate that 
the children need to be kept in a safe situation. As we 
understand the bus companies themselves will, in essence, 
do the same as the airlines and the bus driver will make 
sure that they are handed only to appropriate people or 
maintain their security if there is a stop or something 
along those lines. So, no question, we want to cooperate 
in that regard to make sure the children are safe. 
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THE COURT: Okay. 
2 I MR, CHRISTENSEN: I'm not exactly sure what that 
3 meant. 
4 THE COURT: Well, I think what he is saying is 
5 I that's not a problem, that they would agree. 
6 J MR. CHRISTENSEN: That a one way bus trip -
MR. ANDREASEN: It's always a one way bus trip — 
8 j THE COURT: Well, you know, so they don't have to 
9 transfer buses and that sort of thing. 
10 I MR. ANDREASEN: Subject to the bus company, as 
11 the airlines do, making sure they keep the children safe if 
12 they're alone. 
13 I THE COURT: Okay. Anything else? 
14 | MR. CHRISTENSEN: So, is the bottom line that the 
15 children can transfer and ride the bus so long as— 
16 THE COURT: You know, I have some sympathy with 
17 idea that they wouldn't have to, obviously the bus is going 
18 | to stop in various locations but -
19 | MS. ROUNDY: There is a bus transfer on the trip 
20 to Bozeman, that's why I'm concerned. 
21 THE COURT: Where do they transfer from? 
22 MS. ROUNDY: I don't know but it's not a straight 
23 I shot and they have to get on a different bus. And also, he 
24 I wants the two youngest ones, the 10 and the 13 year old to 
25 I travel without the older one on the bus and I don't want 
65 
that to happen. Those two children do not get along* They 
fight all the time and they could get themselves kicked off 
3 I the bus somewhere along the route. And I'm very concerned 
4 with the safety of the children on the bus, especially when 
5 he has factored into his thing $500 for transportation for 
6 J the kids. It doesn't cost that much more to fly them. 
MR. ANDREASEN: Your Honor, may we contact the 
8 bus company and, I'm sure they have established procedures. 
9 We'll obtain those for your Honor and make sure that they 
10 are adequate for the protection of the children. 
11 THE COURT: That's fair. Why don't you get 
12 whatever it is that you need to get and supply that to 
13 counsel? 
14 MR. ANDREASEN: Sure. 
15 MS. ROBERTSON: Can we stipulate that they all 
16 three have to be together if they go, not just the two 
17 youngest? 
18 THE COURT: Well, but you see at the present time 
19 | that would work fine but soon the oldest one, in another 
20 couple of years might not be available and the younger ones 
21 presumably will get a little older and a little more 
22 mature. So, it would be difficult to establish a rule now 
23 J that's going to have application. 
24 MS. ROUNDY: Well, I can't let my 13 year old and 
25 my 10 year old travel on that bus together by themselves. 
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1 THE COURT: Any I don't see any problem with 
2 that. 
3 MS. ROUNDY: You don't know the kids. They can't 
A even ride in a car together, they fight. 
5 THE COURT: Hold on, hold on. They are not 
6 always going to be 13 and 10 and they are not always going 
7 to fight. 
8 MS. ROBERTSON: Well, can we put an age when they 
9 turn 16 or 17 or something? 
10 THE COURT: Well, why don't we take a look at 
11 what the bus company can do for us and then we'll consider 
12 that. 
13 MR. CHRISTENSEN: I think her big concern is that 
14 the bus ride takes 12 hours 
15 MS. ROBERTSON: It takes 12 hours. 
16 THE COURT: I know, I know. But kids are 
17 resilient. Anything else? 
18 MR. ANDREASEN: No, your Honor. 
19 THE COURT: Court's in recess 
20 J (Whereupon the hearing was concluded.) 
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